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anti-bundling rules adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”) in 1992. While we find that the courts have carefully developed a
framework for the proper scope and application of the rules, the SEC and
proxy advisory firms have been less vigilant in defending this instrumental
shareholder right. In particular, we note that the most recent SEC
interpretive guidance has undercut the effectiveness of the existing rules,
and that, surprisingly, proxy advisory firms do not have well-defined
heuristics to discourage bundling.
Building on the theoretical framework, this Article provides the first
large-scale empirical study of bundling of management proposals. We
develop four possible definitions of impermissible bundling and, utilizing a
data set of over 1,300 management proposals, show that the frequency of
bundling in our sample ranges from 6.2 percent to 28.8 percent (depending
on which of the four bundling definitions is used). It is apparent that
bundling occurs far more frequently than indicated by prior studies.
We further examine our data to report the items that are most
frequently bundled and to analyze the proxy advisors’ recommendations
and the voting patterns associated with bundled proposals. This Article
concludes with important implications for the SEC, proxy advisors, and
institutional investors as to how each party can more effectively deter
impermissible bundling and thus better protect the shareholder franchise.
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INTRODUCTION
The shareholders’ franchise to vote provides the ideological
underpinning that “legitimates the exercise of power by some (directors
and officers) over vast aggregations of property that they do not own.”1
While historically both state and federal law protected the legitimacy of
corporate voting, beginning in 1934 with the passage of Section 14 of the
1934 Exchange Act, federal law has taken the laboring oar in safeguarding
shareholders’ voting rights. 2 In particular, Section 14 constructs an
elaborate regulatory framework around the format, content, and timing of
proxy statements and proxy cards that public companies send to their
investors in preparation for their shareholder meetings to elect directors and
to vote on other corporate matters requiring shareholder approval. The
animating philosophy behind Congress’s enactment of Section 14 and the
1. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988). Shareholders have
few rights and the few they enjoy are deeply qualified. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the
Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675, 676 (2007); Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of
Shareholders, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 407, 407 (2006). Nonetheless, the right to vote, whether in the
election of directors or matters that corporate law requires at least the consent of the shareholders, is
foundational to the governance model of the modern public corporation. For an insightful review of
different views of the purpose behind the power to vote, see Robert B. Thompson & Paul H. Edelman,
Corporate Voting, 62 VAND. L. REV. 129, 145–52 (2009) (embracing the important role of shareholder
voting based on “error correction” in the firm’s stock price while rejecting other theories, including that
voting addresses the “incomplete contract” problems in business settings).
2. See, e.g., 2 JAMES D. COX & THOMAS L. HAZEN, COX & HAZEN ON CORPORATIONS § 13.30
(3d ed. 2010).
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SEC’s proxy rules is that shareholders need to be fully informed about all
of the matters on which corporate law requires their approval. Indeed, the
proxy rules are central to governance of public companies.
In 1992, the SEC greatly strengthened the shareholder franchise
through a suite of amendments to the proxy rules. 3 Among the changes
introduced by the 1992 amendments were two rules, referred to as the
“Unbundling Rules,” 4 that prohibit companies from “bundling” together
multiple voting items into a single proposal with a single box on the proxy
card. The SEC’s rules target such bundled proposals since they distort
shareholder choice, and thereby disenfranchise shareholders. Bundling has
another harmful effect: joining in one resolution two distinct substantive
items has the necessary effect of preventing shareholders from expressing
their views to directors on each matter being put to a vote. In other words,
the joinder of unrelated substantive items causes shareholders to approve
items that they might not otherwise want implemented and also robs the
directors of awareness of the shareholders’ views on each bundled
proposal. While these basic principles are easily stated, in practice the rules
have been difficult to implement and, as developed below, have been
further muddled by SEC interpretations that lack the support of both the
SEC’s initial regulatory guidance on bundling and the relevant case law.
In this Paper we provide the first comprehensive evaluation of the
SEC’s Unbundling Rules. We begin in Part I with a discussion of the
corporate governance framework where we see that management enjoys
numerous practical and legal strategic advantages. These advantages are in
stark contrast with the prevalent “nexus of contracts” perspective of
corporate law where consent by owners is a central cog in the governance
wheel. The perspective gained in this discussion underscores the
importance of the shareholder vote, a matter that is directly implicated by
the practice of bundling.
In Part II of the Paper, we provide a careful dissection of the rules
themselves as well as a close analysis of their interpretation by the courts
3. In addition to addressing bundling, the SEC also acted to address how regulation contributes
to the collective action problem among investors in public companies. See Regulation of
Communications Among Shareholders, Exchange Act Release No. 31,326, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,276 (Oct.
22, 1992) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249) [hereinafter Communications Release] (adopting a
wide number of amendments to the proxy rules with the cumulative effect of enabling greater freedom
to interact among shareholders and their advisors in connection with proxy voting). These sweeping
changes were first proposed in Regulation of Communications Among Securityholders, Exchange Act
Release No. 30,849, 57 Fed. Reg. 29,564 (proposed July 2, 1992) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240,
249) [hereinafter Communications Among Securityholders].
4. Exchange Act Rules, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-4(a)(3), (b)(1) (2014).
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and the SEC. We find that the courts have carefully developed several
interpretative approaches to define impermissible bundling. In contrast, we
show that the SEC’s approach to its own rules has become less vigorous
and, as we ultimately conclude, inconsistent with the goals it announced for
the rules when they were adopted. Indeed, we conclude that the SEC
interpretive guidance has undercut the effectiveness of the existing rules
and created unnecessary ambiguity about their proper application.
We conclude Part II with an examination of the voting policies of
third party voting advisors that counsel investors how to vote on proxy
proposals. We find that, surprisingly, these advisors have not developed
any analytical structures for dealing with bundled proposals. We examine
the voting policies of the two major voting advisors, Institutional
Shareholder Services (“ISS”) and Glass Lewis. We find each has failed to
provide clear advice to their clients to vote against bundled proposals.
Instead of operating from well-developed heuristics for detecting harmful
bundling, the advisors act on an ad hoc basis, applying balancing tests to
determine whether the bundled proposals predominantly benefit or harm
shareholders, with the end result being muddled outcomes.
In Part III, to illustrate the spectrum of possible definitions of
impermissible bundling, we offer four possible classifications of bundling.
The four types range from the broadest to the most narrow: (1) any
proposal with more than one item5 (we refer to this as “generic bundling”);
(2) any proposal with more than one item, where at least one of those items
is material (“material bundling”); (3) any proposal with more than one
item, where two or more of those items are material (“multiple material
bundling”); and (4) any proposal with more than one item, where at least
one of those items is material and negatively affects shareholders rights
(“negative bundling”). We also provide various examples of egregious
bundling to highlight the importance of this problem.
Part IV of the Paper applies our four potential tests to a large sample
of actual shareholder votes to determine the prevalence of bundling under
our alternative definitions. Under each of these definitions, we find that
companies engage in impermissible bundling far more frequently than
indicated by prior research. Using a ten-year data set containing a total of
1,349 management proposals, we find some form of bundling was present
in 28.8 percent of those proposals, while nearly 80 percent of the bundling
5. Across the four definitions, by “more than one item” we mean “more than one substantively
different item.” That is, we would not consider a substantively single item with multiple components to
be a case of bundling.
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uncovered involved multiple items with a material impact on the
shareholders.
Next, in Part V, we examine shareholder voting on bundled proposals.
In particular, we provide empirical evidence for how proxy advisors
respond to bundling, their recommendations in connection with bundled
proposals, and how shareholders vote on bundled proposals. These data
provide more insight on the response of proxy advisors to bundling and the
impact of proxy advisors’ recommendations.
We conclude in Part VI with a discussion of the policy implications of
our findings. We provide specific recommendations for both the SEC and
the third party voting advisors so that the pervasive bundling practice we
report here can be addressed and the shareholder franchise can be liberated
from the chains of bundling.
I. SHAREHOLDERS’ VOICE vs. MANAGEMENT’S STRATEGIC
ADVANTAGES IN TODAY’S CORPORATE FRAMEWORK
Abuses of shareholders’ voting rights led to the adoption of Section 14
of the 1934 Exchange Act. 6 Congress’s action “stemmed from the
congressional belief that ‘[f]air corporate suffrage is an important
right . . . .’ It was intended to ‘control the conditions under which proxies
may be solicited with a view to preventing the recurrence of abuses
which . . . [had] frustrated the free exercise of the voting rights of
stockholders.’”7 Over the ensuing decades, the SEC has been vigilant in
protecting shareholder voting rights against potential managerial abuses.
In addition to the election of directors, for which SEC rules strictly
proscribe bundling, 8 shareholder voting customarily arises in three
important areas: charter and bylaw amendments, transactions involving
acquisitions, and executive compensation. 9 Without diminishing the
6. COX & HAZEN, supra note 2, at 545.
7. J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431 (1964) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 13–14
(1934)).
8. In contrast to the approach in the Unbundling Rules—which generally prescribe separate
votes for each separate matter and naturally lead to questions as to what is a separate matter—the SEC
proxy rules take a more definitive approach. In the election of directors, to prevent multiple nominees to
the board being subject only to a single vote, the SEC proxy rules provide that the proxy form must
include a means by which voting shareholders can withhold their vote from any director. 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-4(b)(1). The rules then set forth three distinct nonexclusive means for shareholders to
withhold their vote. § 240.14a-4(b)(2).
9. See Paul H. Edelman et al., Shareholder Voting in an Age of Intermediary Capitalism, 87 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1359, 1367–68 (2014). While there are a variety of other situations that involve
shareholder voting, they are not important for our purposes because they are unlikely to implicate the
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importance of the shareholder voice in approving an acquisition 10 or
executive compensation,11 our study focuses on amendments to either the
charter or the bylaws because, in the contemporary legal context, the
charter and the bylaws are what define the shareholders’ relationship to the
firm. As the next section develops, meaningful shareholder consent is
central to the modern perspective of the public company. To this end, the
Unbundling Rules were adopted by the SEC to protect the exercise of that
consent.
A. NEXUS OF CONTRACTS IDEOLOGY
The most important perspective that shapes corporate law today is the
view that the corporation is a “nexus of contracts.” Building on Ronald
Coase’s perspective on why firms exist (labor, suppliers, customers,
investors, and managers arrange their activities to their optimal benefit),12
leading legal scholars, and in turn practitioners, embrace private ordering
as the desired norm within corporate law. In a world of private ordering,
the state corporate statute is understood to have the limited role of
providing default rules in those instances where the parties have not
otherwise specified how their affairs or activities are to occur.13
Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel were early advocates for
viewing corporate law as consensual. Much of their embrace of the nexus
of contracts theory was based on their belief that it is necessary for business
issues discussed in this paper (for example, shareholder initiated votes using Rule 14a-8, mandatory
say-on-pay votes, or contested elections which involve single items with a single voting box on the
ballot).
10. Shareholder voting is also important for some types of M&A activity. For instance, under
state corporate law, mergers and consolidations require shareholder approval by both companies
involved in the transaction. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (2016); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT
§ 11.04(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2007). There are exceptions to these mandatory voting requirements for the
shareholders of an acquiring company in a small-scale merger. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 251(f); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 11.04(g). More narrowly, sales of all or substantially all of
the assets of a corporation require the approval of only the selling corporation’s shareholders. See, e.g.,
DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271; MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 12.02. There are also exceptions for
shareholders of a subsidiary corporation when the acquirer invokes the short-form merger process. See,
e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (requiring at least 90 percent ownership by parent); MODEL BUS.
CORP. ACT § 11.05 (same).
11. In the executive compensation area, shareholder voting is necessary for most stock option
plans. See Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, The Determinants of Shareholder Voting on Stock
Option Plans, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 31, 47–48 (2000).
12. See generally, R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
13. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 1416, 1426 (1989) (referring to the corporation as a “nexus of contracts,” which “is just short hand
for the complex arrangements of many sorts that those who associate voluntarily in the corporation will
work out among themselves”).
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enterprises to be “adaptive” because organizations, and their actors, are
buffeted by an ever-changing business environment. 14 Businesses, they
argued, are dynamic entities best served by adaptive actors. From this
perspective, it is natural to conclude that the law should accommodate this
reality. To this end, they reason that owners and managers must be able to
tailor their relationship to ever-changing circumstances. To nexus of
contracts adherents, corporate rules are not mandatory, but default rules;
the parties are free to tailor the relationship to their own particular needs.15
Pursuant to this view, corporate law as provided by the state is merely
facilitative of private bargaining––corporate law is not public, but private
law. In such a realm, the only issue in doubt is what constitutes consent
among the affected parties; after all, the consent that Coase and contract
theory so heavily depend upon as the basis for the efficiency is the outcome
of bargaining.
Because consent is a necessary feature for the contractual paradigm
and therefore is foundational to corporate law today, the efficacy of proxy
voting is of great import; simply stated, because a contract arises when and
only when there is a meeting of the minds on the parties’ respective
undertakings, choice, both free and informed, is central to the relationship
owners have to their corporation. 16 The best way to insure that the
shareholders consent to entering into, or altering, the corporate contract is
by seeking their fully informed approval of that contract or any changes to
it. Informed shareholder voting is an obvious solution to the question of
how to obtain such consent.17
14. See id. at 1428.
15. See id. at 1434–36.
16. Consent and contracting can be found within the shareholder’s relationship to the
corporation; but that relationship is richer and potentially more fluid than contractual relationships
because of a set of governance arrangements and procedures that permeate corporate statutes and
thereby define corporate organizations. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Consent in Corporate Law,
70 BUS. LAW. 161, 162 (Winter 2014/15) (arguing that consent is also a necessary component of
governance). Consent can be found at the moment the shareholder purchases shares in the corporation;
the transaction is bound by consideration on the part of the corporation and the shareholder, and the
terms of their bargain are set forth in the laws of the state of incorporation, the articles of incorporation,
and the bylaws. Thereafter, changes in this contract can be understood to occur when the state of
incorporation amends its corporate statute, the corporation amends its articles of incorporation, or the
bylaws are amended.
17. Recent decisions in Delaware, although invoking the nexus of contracts approach, have
invited close scrutiny of what constitutes consent as well as the soundness of the nexus of contracts
perspective. In Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corp., Chancellor Strine held that
the board acting without the consent of the shareholders could nonetheless adopt a bylaw provision that
permitted the corporation to choose the forum in which a shareholder-initiated suit would be
maintained. Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 939 (Del. Ch. 2013).
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B. RELATIVE BARGAINING POWER OF SHAREHOLDERS AND MANAGERS
Inside this contractual framework, management, not the shareholders,
enjoys a significant strategic advantage within the dynamics of the
corporate web within which the shareholder contract exists. It is this point
that raises our concern for bundling. Consider that the corporate documents
are the supreme source of the contract that exists between the corporation
and its shareholders. Shareholders and managers, however, do not approach
changes in the charter or bylaws on the same footing.
1. Charter Amendments
Any change to the corporate charter must first be proposed by the
board of directors18 so that the shareholders’ role is reactive, not proactive,
in shaping the change that is proposed. Because of this, management enjoys
a strategic advantage over shareholders in controlling the timing, details,
and information that surrounds the proposal.19 Further adding to the power
This decision was followed by ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund where the Delaware Supreme
Court, relying on the reasoning in Boilermakers, upheld a board-adopted bylaw concerning litigation
costs that abandoned the long-maintained “American Rule” whereby litigants bear their own costs, and
instead made the plaintiff bear the defendant’s expenses—which would include the corporation’s costs
in a derivative suit—unless the plaintiff prevailed. ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d
554, 558 (Del. 2014). Boilermakers and ATP Tour each reasoned from the perspective that the
shareholders’ relationship with the corporation, and in turn their relationship to the board of directors, is
contractual so that much of the shareholders’ rights can be understood to flow from certain organic
documents, and most significantly and pervasively from the company’s bylaws.
It is not our purpose here to question the force or legality of such unilateral action. Instead we
invoke the controversy that has surrounded Boilermakers and ATP Tour as a testament of the
importance society assigns to shareholder voting. As we noted earlier, in Atlas, former Chancellor Allen
observed that it is the shareholders’ voting franchise that provides the ideological underpinning that
“legitimates the exercise of power by some (directors and officers) over vast aggregations of property
that they do not own.” Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988). Building
on this insight, we believe the results reached in both decisions would have been significantly less
controversial, and likely not controversial at all, had the bylaws been adopted with the approval of the
shareholders. Not only does such approval improve the optics of the transaction that otherwise can be
seen as self-serving on the part of the directors (who are likely to be the targets of shareholder suits),
but such approval would more easily fall within prevailing notions of governance while obtaining the
type of consent on which the nexus of contracts paradigm invokes the least controversy. However, the
data collected and analyzed in this study raises a good deal of disquiet regarding the vulnerability of the
shareholder franchise. That is, our empirical analysis identifies many instances in which impermissible
bundling likely distorted the outcomes of proxy votes—suggesting that even proposals adopted with
shareholder consent may be controversial because self-interested managers can skew the voting process.
18. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(1) (2016); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.03(a)
(AM. BAR ASS’N 2007).
19. Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833,
863 (2005) (“Management . . . has the sole power to put proposals on the table, and shareholders have
to vote up or down on these proposals without having the option to amend them.”). The power to set the
agenda also enables management to obtain approval of measures which decrease shareholder value. Id.
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imbalance is the well-known collective action problem that weakens the
shareholders’ voice. 20 Such concerns regarding the imbalance of power
between managers and owners support the view that when interpreting the
proxy rules, such as the Unbundling Rules, the potential of adverse
consequences on the critical role of consent should be fully understood, so
that at least when changes to the corporate charter are being proposed the
imbalance is not exacerbated.
2. Bylaw Amendments
In contrast to corporate law’s treatment of amending the charter,
bylaws can be initiated by the shareholders as well as by the board of
directors.21 Nonetheless, a board acting to amend the bylaws enjoys three
strategic advantages over shareholders who seek to change their
relationship to the corporation through amending the bylaws.
The first two advantages are grounded in economic theory. To begin
with, the informational advantages of those in control permit them not only
to time a change to their own advantage, but to understand better than
outside shareholders the full effects of a bylaw change they propose. As a
consequence of their information advantages, managers are well positioned
to act opportunistically to pursue self-interested ends of which only they
can be fully aware. Second, insiders acting to amend bylaws do not face the
formidable collective action problem that outside shareholders incur in
moving a bylaw through the approval process. While both boards and
shareholders enjoy the right to amend the bylaws, the board, being a
cohesive body, as a practical matter enjoys lower costs and less uncertainty
by choosing the bylaw course of action. Indeed, under corporate law, any
cost related to board-initiated actions is borne by the corporation, whereas
the shareholders’ cost to act, and most importantly to persuade fellow
shareholders, is borne by the activist shareholder.
Thirdly, the law tilts heavily against the shareholders in American
public companies having the right to alter the fundamental structure of the
corporation; corporate statutes set forth the basic structure of the
corporation subject to countervailing provisions in the articles of
incorporation. Thus, if there are changes from the default rule that
corporate affairs are managed by or under the direction of the board of
at 865.
20. John C. Coates, IV, Measuring the Domain of Mediating Hierarchy: How Contestable Are
U.S. Public Corporations?, 24 J. CORP. L. 837, 849 (1999) (closely examining weaknesses in
shareholder voting due to the collective action problem).
21. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109; MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.20.
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directors, the preferred structure must appear in the articles of
incorporation. As discussed earlier, only the board of directors has the
power to initiate amendments to the articles of incorporation.22 This feature
of American corporate law not only reduces the shareholders to a reactive
role in defining their governance structure, but also necessarily restricts the
area that is a proper subject for shareholder action.
The Delaware Supreme Court’s holding in CA, Inc. v. AFSCME
Employees Pension Plan illustrates this point. 23 Shareholders sought to
include on management’s proxy statement a bylaw whereby a nonmanagement nominee who was elected to the board should be reimbursed
for reasonable expenses incurred in that nominee’s successful contest for
office. The Delaware Supreme Court held that the shareholders’ authority
to amend the bylaws was limited to matters that are “procedural [or]
process-oriented,” 24 meaning that bylaws that encroach upon the
managerial authority of the board of directors would be inappropriate. This
construction was based on the Delaware court providing that “[t]he
business and affairs of every corporation . . . shall be managed by or under
the direction of the board of directors, except as may be otherwise
provided . . . in its certificate of incorporation.”25 If shareholders had the
authority to initiate an amendment of the articles of incorporation, they
would not be limited to “procedural [or] process-oriented” matters; they
could initiate, as the board can initiate, a wide-range of substantive
alterations to the conduct of the corporate affairs. Since shareholders lack
authority in the very area that the board enjoys authority, the shareholders’
prerogative to initiate is greatly constrained within a private-ordering
environment; questions regarding the authority to change or opt out of a
default rule will therefore not be found when it is the board acting to
change the rules of the game rather than when the action is by the
shareholders. It is for this reason that the nexus of contracts rubric
necessarily threatens shareholder protection.
It is interesting to consider further the relative power of the
shareholders and directors to alter the rules of governance. Even though the
bylaw involved in CA, Inc. was deemed to be process and procedurally
oriented, the court held the proposed bylaw was not appropriate for
shareholder action because the proposed bylaw could possibly be
interpreted to require reimbursement in instances that would be inconsistent
22.
23.
24.
25.

See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227 (Del. 2008).
Id. at 235.
Id. at 232 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a)).
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with the board’s fiduciary obligations.26 By contrast, in Boilermakers Local
154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corp., 27 a pension fund challenged a
board-adopted forum selection bylaw by raising multiple examples where
the bylaw could be harmful to the corporation. Similar to CA, Inc., the
pension fund argued that this rendered the bylaw invalid. Chancellor Strine
summarily dismissed that challenge on the ground that “it would be
imprudent and inappropriate to address these hypotheticals in the absence
of a genuine controversy with concrete facts.”28
The contrasting rulings in Boilermakers and CA, Inc. have led some of
the authors of this Article to question whether shareholder and boardinitiated bylaws stand on the same footing:29 a shareholder-initiated bylaw
is subject to a threshold determination that the subject is organically of the
type that is proper for shareholder action and is also subject to ex ante
scrutiny for its potential inconsistencies with corporate law; in contrast,
board-initiated bylaws escape such ex ante scrutiny.30
26. Id. at 239–40. The Delaware Supreme Court reasoned that because the bylaw could be
invoked by a candidate who sought office solely to advance personal, rather than corporate, interest, the
bylaw was invalid.
27. Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934 (Del. Ch. 2013).
28. Id. at 940.
29. One of us has written a recent article making this point. James D. Cox, Corporate Law and
the Limits of Private Ordering, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 257 (2015).
30. The authors begin their analysis by observing that both the reimbursement bylaw in CA, Inc.
and the forum selection bylaw in Boilermakers employed “shall” as the operative verb. CA, Inc., 953
A.2d at 230 (“The board of directors shall cause the corporation to reimburse a stockholder . . . .”
(emphasis added)); Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 942 (“Unless the Corporation consents in writing, . . . the
Court of Chancery . . . shall be the sole and exclusive forum . . . .” (emphasis added)). However, in the
case of CA, Inc., the proposed bylaw mandated action by the board, whereas with Boilermakers, the
bylaw was more broadly proscriptive in identifying the venue for suit, mandating suits be in the Court
of Chancery unless the board exercised its discretion for a suit to be in another jurisdiction. However,
that choice could only be made by the board if made in writing, so to this small extent there was some
impact on how the board was to exercise its choice. In both cases, there were two distinct lines of attack
on the bylaw: (1) whether the body adopting the bylaw had the authority to act on the subject matter;
and (2) whether, assuming authority, the bylaw nonetheless was inappropriate because it could
authorize later conduct that would be a violation of the directors’ fiduciary obligation. CA, Inc. and
Boilermakers each answered the first question affirmatively, albeit using different approaches to justify
the shareholder’s authority in CA, Inc. and the board’s authority to act in Boilermakers. What these
authors find instructive here is the courts’ divergence on the second issue due to the differing
approaches towards bylaws initiated by the board and bylaws initiated by shareholders. This is evident
in Chancellor (now Chief Justice) Strine’s reasoning as to why the plaintiffs’ “parade of horribles” did
not render the forum selection bylaw invalid, whereas the imagined situation in CA, Inc. did render the
reimbursement bylaw invalid:
The plaintiffs try to show that the forum selection bylaws are inconsistent with law and thus
facially invalid by expending much effort on conjuring up hypothetical as-applied challenges
in which a literal application of the bylaws might be unreasonable. . . . [I]f a plaintiff believes
that a forum selection clause cannot be equitably enforced in a particular situation, the
plaintiff may sue in her preferred forum and respond to the defendant’s motion to dismiss for
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We are left with a conundrum in corporate governance. Shareholder
consent is vital to the legitimacy of the corporate organization. However,
shareholders are largely constrained in the exercise of their consent to
reacting to management proposals. Moreover, these constraints occur in a
practical and legal environment that heavily favor management—the
customary initiator of the instances where shareholders vote. This suggests
to us that the space in which the legitimizing voice of the shareholders
dwells is both rare and hallowed and, therefore, worthy of the utmost
protection. With this in mind, we next examine the scope and purposes of
the Unbundling Rules as important safeguards to the shareholders’
franchise to vote.
II. THE UNBUNDLING RULES
Shareholders’ voting choices are necessarily distorted when
management bundles multiple items into a single proposal on which it
permits only one vote. For example, management may propose to the
shareholders two charter or bylaw amendments for their approval. If
instead of providing for separate votes on each amendment, the two distinct
proposals are combined in a single resolution, the shareholders are robbed
of expressing a distinct choice with respect to each because their joinder
improper venue by arguing that, under Bremen, the forum selection clause should not be
respected because its application would be unreasonable. The plaintiff may also argue that,
under Schnell, the forum selection clause should not be enforced because the bylaw was being
used for improper purposes inconsistent with the directors’ fiduciary duties.
Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 958 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
The question that arises from Chancellor Strine’s reasoning is why this approach was not
equally suitable for the broad bylaw before the court in CA, Inc. Since Chancellor Strine does not
distinguish the cases by the operative language of the two bylaws, the distinction between the two
opinions with respect to confronting the question of the bylaw’s possible overreach can be seen as
according bylaws initiated by the board with a presumption of propriety that is missing with bylaws
adopted by the shareholders.
A possible counterargument to this point offered by one commentator on this Article is that
there were differences in the language of the bylaws in the two cases: the bylaw in CA, Inc. was
mandatory in all instances, whereas the bylaw in Boilermakers offered the board a limited avenue to
exercise its discretion, suggesting that the different rulings might be attributed to the differences in the
language of the bylaws.
One might believe that the contrasting approaches between CA, Inc. and Boilermakers are
symptomatic of a larger problem with the architecture of corporate law, namely that the role and
prerogatives of the board of directors is believed to be more clearly defined than the role and
prerogatives of shareholders. See Velasco, supra note 1, at 430–34. However, because corporate
statutes are areas where the shareholders enjoy protected rights that are defined with a good deal of
precision, it would appear the problem is not a lack of precision but rather too much. As a result, the
board, whose authority is broadly stated, enjoys unrestrained deference, whereas shareholders, whose
rights are precisely defined, have erroneously not been accorded similar deference by the courts when
they have mediated conflicts between the broad grant of authority to the board and more selective
grants to the shareholders.
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means the package must be approached by the shareholders as an all-up or
all-down vote. The problem becomes most invidious when management
attempts to “sweeten” one proposed anti-shareholder rights amendment by
combining it with a second pro-shareholder amendment. Thus,
shareholders may either accept the good with the bad (the proverbial
spoonful of sugar to help the sour medicine go down), or reject both. This
presents a distorted choice to shareholders. Not surprisingly, these efforts
have been controversial.
The problem of bundling was well known in the 1980s when public
companies regularly proposed to recapitalize by converting to a dual class
common stock structure. 31 During that era, proposals would combine a
small immediate dividend payment with changes to the voting structure of
the company that entrenched managers by providing them with controlling
voting rights in the firm. 32 Despite the long-term negative impact on
shareholders, such recapitalizations were generally approved by
shareholders because they were willing to forego uncertain greater future
returns in the form of a potential takeover premium for the certainty of an
immediate payout. 33 Certainly if both the special distribution and the
recapitalization benefitted shareholders, there would have been no need for
their joinder as each would have been approved independently if voted on
separately. Their joinder, however, provided assurance to management that
the bitter (entrenchment device) would be swallowed with the sweet (cash
payout). Although midstream dual class recapitalizations largely
disappeared by the mid-1990s, 34 bundling continued to be an issue for
31. In a typical recapitalization to dual class common stock, a firm would offer incentives
(maybe a special dividend) to investors holding shares of the company’s common stock to accept lowertier, often non-voting, stock. These “midstream” recapitalizations were often followed by large
decreases in the value of shares (due to the entrenching effects of dual class shares where voting shares
are held by management). See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Ties That Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and the
Problem of Shareholder Choice, 76 CAL. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (1988).
32. Id. at 48 (“Management can ‘sweeten’ a proposal that decreases shareholder wealth by
bundling it with an unrelated proposal that increases wealth[,] . . . complicat[ing] the shareholder choice
problem considerably and in the end distort[ing] the choice in management’s favor.”).
33. Gordon rejects the claim that by approving a sweetened proposal, shareholders and
management have simply engaged in a mutually beneficial exchange leading to a Pareto improvement.
Id. at 49. He argues that the presence of a significant insider bloc creates a scenario in which
management need only convince a sufficiently large minority of public shareholders to accept the
proposal in order for it to be approved. Id. By contrast, with no insider bloc, at least half of the public
shareholders would have to approve the measure. Id. Further, by sweetening proposals with difficult-tovalue provisions, management can achieve that sufficiently large minority relatively easier than with an
easy-to-value sweetener because estimations as to value of the sweetener will be more dispersed. Id.
Gordon notes that “[i]n this way, a sweetener operates less as a basis for a trade and more as a means
for distorting shareholder choice.” Id.
34. For one, the SEC adopted a rule prohibiting it in 1988, although that law was overturned in
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shareholders.
In 1992, the SEC acted to prohibit the “electoral tying arrangements
that restrict shareholder voting choices.”35 It promulgated Rule 14a-4(a)(3),
which states that “the form of proxy [s]hall identify clearly and impartially
each separate matter intended to be acted upon, whether or not related to
or conditioned on the approval of other matters . . . .”36 Further, Rule 14a4(b)(1) requires that shareholders must be given “an opportunity to specify
by boxes a choice between approval or disapproval of, or abstention with
respect to each separate matter referred to therein as intended to be acted
upon.” 37 In its Adopting Release, the SEC explained that the two rules
serve a dual purpose: to “permit shareholders to [(1)] communicate to the
board of directors their views on each of the matters put to a vote, and [(2)]
not be forced to approve or disapprove a package of items and thus approve
matters they might not if presented independently.”38 Thus, since at least
1992, federal law has required that discrete proposals be voted on
separately.39
A. BUNDLING IN THE COURTS
Since the adoption of the Unbundling Rules, there have been two key
judicial decisions interpreting the rules: Koppel v. 4987 Corp. 40 and
Greenlight Capital, L.P. v. Apple, Inc. 41 Both of these cases provide
important guidance regarding the rules’ purpose, scope, and application.
1. Koppel v. 4987 Corp.
In Koppel, the complaint alleged that a shareholder vote on the
possible sale of a closely-held firm violated the Unbundling Rules because
court two years later. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Short Life and Resurrection of SEC Rule 19c-4, 69
WASH. U. L.Q. 565, 566–67 (1991). By 1994, the major stock exchanges had all adopted rules
prohibiting the practice. Id. at 626. See also Lucian A. Bebchuk & Ehud Kamar, Bundling and
Entrenchment, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1549, 1558 (2010).
35. Communications Release, supra note 3, at 48,287.
36. Exchange Act Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(a)(3) (2014) (emphasis added).
37. Id. § 240.14a-4(b)(1) (emphasis added).
38. Communications Among Securityholders, supra note 3, at 29,566.
39. But see Bebchuk & Kamar, supra note 34, at 1559 n.26. Bebchuk and Kamar claim that,
because the Unbundling Rules allow for votes on one proposal to be contingent upon the results of
another vote, they are too weak to prevent bundling. Id. They state that “[t]he unbundling rule permits
management to condition the adoption of one proposal on the approval of another proposal. The rule
requires only that shareholders be able to vote on the proposals separately—even if the approval of only
one means that neither is implemented.” Id.
40. Koppel v. 4987 Corp., 167 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 1999).
41. Greenlight Capital, L.P. v. Apple, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24716 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22,
2013).
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the proxy card provided for a single up-or-down vote on three issues:
(1) forbearance from terminating a net lease on a piece of property, (2) the
sale of said property, and (3) distribution of the proceeds from the sale of
the property.42 While the plaintiff supported the sale of the property, he
opposed the proposed distribution of proceeds scheme. He therefore
challenged under the Unbundling Rules the two items being combined in a
single resolution submitted to the shareholders. He argued that a single upor-down vote meant that the shareholders’ choice was distorted as they
would have to vote to forego the sale of the building entirely or vote to
accept an unfair distribution scheme.43
To reach the merits, the Second Circuit first addressed whether an
implied private right of action existed for the Unbundling Rules, an issue of
first impression. Building upon the Supreme Court’s earlier recognition of
the implied right of action under Rule 14a-9 for material misleading proxy
statements,44 the Second Circuit held there was an implied right of action
for bundling, reasoning that “[i]mpermissible grouping of voting items
frustrates fair corporate suffrage and the voting rights of shareholders no
less than a misrepresentation or omission in a proxy.”45 The Second Circuit
emphasized the harm of bundling by observing in its recognition of a
private action that “not permitting such an action ‘would be demonstrably
inequitable to a class of would-be plaintiffs with claims comparable to
those previously recognized.’” 46 The court further reasoned that private
enforcement of the Unbundling Rules was needed to augment SEC
enforcement efforts.47
On the merits of the claim, the court found that the Unbundling Rules
required that “separate matters” be put to separate votes. 48 The court
emphasized that the SEC’s Adopting Release “suggest[ed] a strong
preference for more voting items rather than fewer” when deciding whether
items were separate matters from one another.49 The court stated that “the
SEC recognized that the new rules were specifically intended to
42. Koppel, 167 F.3d at 134.
43. Id.
44. See J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430–31 (1964).
45. Koppel, 167 F.3d at 135–36.
46. Id. at 136 (quoting Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1104 (1991)).
47. Id. (“[W]e first note that the SEC has made clear through its submissions to this Court that it
‘needs private actions as a supplement to its efforts to enforce Rule14a-4’s separate matter requirement
due to its limited staff resources.’” (quoting Letter from Harvey J. Goldschmid, Sec. Exch. Comm’n
Gen. Counsel, to Lucille Carr, Operations Manager, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Nov.
18, 1998))).
48. Id. at 138.
49. Id. (citing Communications Release, supra note 3, at 48,287).
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‘“unbundle”management proposals’ and that those individual voting items
may well constitute closely related matters.”50 The court further observed
that this edict should be all the more palatable to management because SEC
rules expressly provided that management could still condition one
proposal on the approval of another. 51 Absent state corporation law on
point, the court held that the actual issue of what constitutes a “separate
matter” for purposes of the two rules is ultimately a question of fact to be
determined in light of the corporate documents and in consideration of the
SEC’s apparent preference for more voting items rather than fewer.52
In the years following Koppel there were few cases invoking the
Unbundling Rules; 53 much of the guidance on their interpretation was
ultimately provided in the 2013 decision in Greenlight Capital.54
2. Greenlight Capital, L.P. v. Apple, Inc.
In Greenlight Capital, a hedge fund, seeking a means for Apple to
distribute a portion of its significant cash, mounted a campaign to convince
Apple, Inc. to issue perpetual preferred shares invoking the board’s “blank
check” authority (such a provision is more commonly referred to as “blank
stock” authority, the convention we employ here except when drawing
directly on the reasoning of Greenlight Capital).55 Apple’s board rejected
the proposal and thereupon sought a shareholder vote to amend its
corporate charter to remove the Apple board’s blank check authority.56 In
seeking this amendment, Apple packaged in a single resolution the charter
amendment that would remove the blank check authority with three other
charter amendments: (1) adding a majority voting provision for the election
of incumbent board members in uncontested elections, (2) establishing a
nominal par value for Apple’s stock, and (3) eliminating certain obsolete
charter provisions. 57 Greenlight called foul and filed suit alleging that a
50. Id. (quoting Communications Release, supra note 3, at 48,287).
51. Id. at 138.
52. Id. The court was careful to point out that it was not deciding the merits of the anti-bundling
rule violations, but merely stating that the claim should not have been dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).
Id. at 138–39. The case was remanded for further proceedings and was litigated before a jury. The jury
returned a verdict for the defendants. See Greenberg v. Malkin, 39 F. App’x 633, 633 (2d Cir. 2002).
53. See, e.g., Complaint at 5–7, MacCormack v. Groupon, Inc., No. 1:13-cv-00940-GMS (D.
Del. May 24, 2013), http://securities.stanford.edu/filings-documents/1050/GRPN00_03/2013524_f01c_
13CV00940.pdf.
54. Greenlight Capital, L.P. v. Apple, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24716 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22,
2013).
55. Id. at *5–6.
56. Id.
57. Id. at *4.
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single vote on all three items violated the Unbundling Rules.58
Apple offered five defenses: (1) the proposed voting item had only
one matter for consideration—whether or not to amend the articles, (2) it
was common proxy practice to package multiple amendments into a single
item, (3) the proxy statement was not challenged by the SEC, (4) the voting
item did not group more than one item which had a substantial effect on
shareholder rights, and (5) the proposed provisions were pro-shareholder.59
The first three defenses were easily rejected, 60 but the fourth and fifth
claims were more significant.
In the fourth defense, Apple claimed that the amendments were
technical or ministerial, forcing the court to determine the materiality of the
items included in the proposal. The court began its analysis by emphasizing
the dual purposes of the Unbundling Rules as set forth by the SEC in the
Adopting Release: (1) to allow shareholders to “communicate to the board
of directors [shareholders’] views on each of the matters put to a vote” and
(2) to not force shareholders “to approve or disapprove a package of items
and thus approve matters they might not if presented independently.”61 In
light of these dual purposes, the court reasoned that “management may not
propose several, aggregated charter amendments ‘by treating them
as . . . [one] vote on the restatement of corporate documents,’ but it may
combine ‘ministerial or technical matters’ that do not alter substantive
shareholder rights.” 62 The court held that Apple’s proxy grouping
impermissibly forced shareholders to approve or disapprove a package of
items they would not have approved or disapproved if the items had been
presented independently and denied shareholders the ability to
communicate to management their views on each item put to a vote.63
The court then discussed the materiality of each bundled item.
Beginning with the elimination of the board’s blank check authority, the
58. Id. at *6.
59. Id. at *15–16.
60. The first defense—that the proposal was limited to amending the corporate articles—was
dismissed because there were four discrete proposals “that, unless ministerial or technical, require
separate shareholder votes.” Id. at *16. As to the second defense—that Apple’s proxy statement was
consistent with numerous other proxy statements—the court reasoned that none of the proxy statements
cited by Apple had been held to comply with SEC rules, so this argument was “of no moment.” Id. at
*17. The court threw out the third defense—SEC inaction—declining to draw the inference that the
proxy statement was in compliance simply because the SEC had failed to act. Id. at *17–19.
61. Id. at *14 (quoting Communications Among Securityholders, supra note 3, at 29,566).
62. Id. at *14–15 (quoting RANDALL S. THOMAS & CATHERINE T. DIXON, ARANOW & EINHORN
ON PROXY CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL § 9.01, at 9-23 to -24 (3d ed. 1999)).
63. Id. at *15.
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court found that Apple’s claim that it would seek shareholder approval
before issuing preferred stock in the future was unsupported by the facts64
and that “the very existence of th[e] action . . . suggests that elimination of
the ‘blank check’ provision is indeed material.” 65 Moreover, the court
noted that the provisions relating to majority voting and to par value could
be deemed material; thus, the court was not persuaded by Apple’s assertion
that shareholders could cast their ballots simply based on their preferences
with respect to blank check authority.
In reaching its conclusion that the Unbundling Rules were violated,
Greenlight Capital provides three important interpretative principles. First,
the court stated that even if the additional items were merely technical,
bundling numerous technical matters with a single material matter violated
the Unbundling Rules. 66 Second, it recognized that some of the proxy
advisory services (namely, ISS and Glass Lewis) had noticed that the
proposals were bundled together, and one of them (Glass Lewis) had also
indicated that there were two material matters in Proposal Number 2, which
the court considered to be additional evidence that Apple’s proxy statement
violated the Unbundling Rules. 67 As we discuss below, both of these
concepts have broad applicability.
Finally, with respect to the fifth defense—that Proposal Number 2 was
“pro-shareholder” and therefore not prohibited—the court noted that
“coercive manipulation” of shareholder voting is only one “evil” addressed
by the Unbundling Rules.68 The court reasoned the Unbundling Rules can
be violated without considering whether the joined proposals are pro- or
anti-shareholder rights or value. We observe that the court’s reasoning on
this point is consistent with that employed by the Supreme Court in Mills v.
64. Apple’s assertion was that the amendment removing the board’s blank check authority was
immaterial because the board would not issue preferred stock in the future without shareholder
approval. Apple’s board thus argued, albeit unsuccessfully, that as a practical matter the blank stock
authorization was superfluous. However, the court pointed out that if the proposal was not approved the
board would still have the power to issue preferred stock without shareholder approval, even if it chose
not to exercise that power immediately. Id. at *19–20.
65. Id. at *20. This assertion was supported by a reference in Greenlight’s reply brief which
stated “[t]hat Apple, its shareholders, and entities like Egan Jones and ISS are debating this issue is a
hallmark of materiality.” Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of the Greenlight Entities’ Motion for
Preliminary Injunction at *3–4, Greenlight Capital v. Apple, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12930
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2013) (No. 13-cv-900-RJS).
66. Greenlight Capital, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24716, at *21–22 (“Permitting Apple to bundle
numerous ‘technical’ matters with a single material matter would appear to still violate the letter of the
law . . . .”).
67. Id. at *21.
68. Id. at *22.
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Electric Auto-Lite Co. where the Supreme Court held that the Seventh
Circuit committed reversible error by using the fairness of the merger terms
to serve as a surrogate for whether a material omission was causally related
to the effectuation of a merger.69 Consistent with Mills, Greenlight Capital
reasoned that the Unbundling Rules are not guided solely by whether
bundling presents shareholders a distorted choice. Rather Greenlight
Capital held that the Unbundling Rules are also directed at facilitating the
goal of permitting shareholders to communicate their views to the board of
directors on each matter put to a vote, and that purpose was defeated by
bundling the proposals together. Thus, the rules are not solely directed
toward proposals that are intentionally coercive in management’s view
because what is and what is not “pro-shareholder” is for the shareholders to
decide.
B. SEC RESPONSES TO KOPPEL AND GREENLIGHT CAPITAL
In recent years, in response to Koppel and Greenlight Capital, the
SEC has provided some additional guidance on the scope of the
Unbundling Rules. As we will see, the SEC’s approach diverges from that
taken by the courts.
1. The SEC’s 2004 Guidance & the 2015 Compliance and Disclosure
Interpretation
In 2004, the SEC set forth guidance (“2004 Guidance”) about the
scope of the Unbundling Rules in the M&A context. In this release, the
SEC focused on bundling concerns raised by practitioners posed by
corporate governance-related or control-related provisions in the context of
mergers and other acquisitions where, in connection with the transaction,
shareholders of the surviving firm undergo a change in their rights or the
firm’s organic structure. 70 The SEC stated that when charter, bylaw, or
similar provisions will become applicable as a result of an acquisition
transaction, unless they are immaterial, the provisions should be presented
as separate voting proposals whenever “the provisions in question were not
previously part of the company’s charter or bylaws[,] the provisions in
question were not previously part of the charter or bylaws of a public
acquiring company[,] and state law, securities exchange listing standards,
or the company’s charter or by-laws would require shareholder approval of
69. See Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 381–83 (1970).
70. U.S. Sec. Exch. Comm’n, Div. of Corp. Fin., Manual of Publicly Available Telephone
Interpretations, U.S. SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/interps/ telephone/phonesupplement5.
htm (last modified Sept. 20, 2004).

2016]

QUIETING THE SHAREHOLDERS’ VOICE

1199

the proposed changes if they were presented on their own.”71 The particular
examples it provided that it believed required separate votes were for
“classified or staggered board[s], limitations on the removal of directors,
supermajority voting provisions, delaying the annual meeting for more than
a year, elimination of ability to act by written consent, and/or changes in
minimum quorum requirements.” 72 Each of the preceding, the SEC
reasoned, must be subject to a single vote.
It is not possible to say the SEC’s 2004 Guidance dampened the
appetite for bundling in connection with acquisition transactions.73 Indeed,
Lucian Bebchuk and Ehud Kamar reach a conclusion similar to our
findings below: their study of mergers and acquisitions finds that
impermissible bundling occurs frequently in mergers and acquisitions. 74
They focus on mergers that bundle in a staggered-board structure into the
surviving corporation.75 Despite serious investor opposition to staggeredboard structures, they show that in a significant number of mergers, moves
to staggered-board structures were indirectly approved by shareholders as a
component of their vote approving the merger.76 Bebchuk and Kamar argue
that the “evidence suggests that control of the corporate agenda enables
management to win approval of measures that shareholders would not
approve on a stand-alone basis.”77
71. Id. However, bylaws that are permitted by the company’s governing documents to be
amended by the board of directors are not required to be unbundled.
72. Id.
73. The 2004 Guidance also offered examples of circumstances in which unbundling would not
be required. First, where an acquired company will be merging into a public company, unbundling is
not required in certain circumstances; where the acquiring public company has provisions in its charter
that differ from those of the acquired company, and the provisions of the acquirer’s charter are not
changing in connection with the merger, unbundling is not required. Id. This exception avoids “the
unnecessary re-approval or ratification of a public company’s pre-existing charter or bylaw provisions.”
Id. Also, where a target company has the same or similar provisions in its charter as those of the
acquirer, no unbundling is necessary. Id. Further, shareholder rights plans “adopted in connection with a
merger . . . generally would not be required to be unbundled” because shareholder approval is not
generally required for a rights plan. Id. Finally, where shareholders of a target company will receive
only cash consideration, unbundling is not required so long as their rights will not be affected by any
provision which later takes effect. Id.
74. Bebchuk & Kamar, supra note 34, at 1567.
75. Id. at 1552.
76. Id. at 1552–53.
77. Id. at 1554. Bebchuk and Kamar examine three different types of mergers: continuing entity
mergers (where A merges into B and B operates as the combined entity), new entity mergers (where A
and B combine to form a new entity, C), and hybrid mergers (where A merges into B conditional on the
approval of amendments in B’s charter). Id. at 1563–65. They “show that the mergers . . . exhibit a
strong tendency to be bundled with the introduction of a charter-based staggered board,” but most
prominently where the charter of the combined entity was new or an amended charter of one of the
constituent firms because managers engage in opportunistic bundling when not confined to the existing
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Addressing concerns regarding bundling in the M&A context, the
SEC recently issued a new Compliance and Disclosure Interpretation
(“2015 Interpretation”). 78 The 2015 Interpretation, which supersedes the
2004 Guidance, provides more precise standards on whether M&A
participants must unbundle proposals in merger and acquisition
transactions.79 Of significance to the subject of bundling examined here is
that the SEC reiterates its prior position that “only material matters must be
unbundled” and defines materiality in this context to mean a resolution that
“substantively affect shareholder rights.”80
2. The SEC’s 2014 Compliance and Disclosure Interpretation
In 2014, partly in response to Greenlight Capital, the SEC released a
Compliance and Disclosure Interpretation (“2014 Interpretation”) on
charters of one constituent firm. See id. at 1567.
As demonstrated in the recent wave of tax inversion deals, the concern that companies
bundle changes to governance provisions with votes on merger transactions remains relevant. For
example, U.S.-based Alkermes, Inc. transitioned from annual director elections to a staggered board
after its merger with a division of Ireland-based Elan Corporation. As in the Bebchuk and Kamar study,
the staggered board was introduced in the proposal to approve the merger agreement rather than as a
separate proposal, requiring shareholders to approve the staggered board if they voted to approve the
merger. Alkermes, Inc., Preliminary Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) 152–54 (June 23, 2011),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/874663/000095012311061225/y87033pmprem14a.htm. This
experience, although outside the cluster of proxy proposals that define our data set, nonetheless raises
concern that the problems identified by Bebchuk and Kamar persist. Our data set suggests that the urge
to bundle, and regrettably the freedom to do so, is pervasive.
78. U.S. Sec. Exch. Comm’n, Div. of Corp. Fin., Compliance and Disclosure Interpretations:
Exchange Act Rule 14a-4(a)(3), U.S. SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/
guidance/exchange-act-rule-14a-4a3.htm (last updated Oct. 27, 2015) [hereinafter 2015 Interpretation].
79. The effect of the 2015 Interpretation remains to be seen. However, although the new 2015
Interpretation will require unbundling in some contexts where bundling was previously permissible, it is
unclear whether the 2015 Interpretation will actually reduce the frequency of bundling or will merely
provide practitioners with greater guidance on whether bundling is permissible (and how to structure
M&A transactions so as to reduce the risk of a bundling violation). In a recent summary of the 2015
Interpretation, one practitioner noted that the Interpretation does “not introduce any significant new
hurdles to obtaining shareholder approval in M&A deals. . . . For practitioners, this will make it easier
to structure transactions where the need for an unbundled proposal can be factored in at the outset.”
Nicholas O’Keefe, SEC Guidance on Unbundling in M&A Context, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Dec. 30, 2015), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/12/30/sec-guidanceon-unbundling-in-ma-context/.
80. 2015 Interpretation, supra note 78. Pursuant to this standard, the shareholders’ approval of a
merger is not to be bundled with a material change in the acquiring firm’s articles of incorporation or
bylaws. Thus, if the plan of merger calls for the acquiring firm to adopt a classified or staggered board
of directors, the SEC concludes this would be a material impact and both the stockholders of the
acquirer and acquired firm should have a separate vote on the amendment. See id. The same result holds
if the acquisition takes the form of a consolidation whereby the constituent corporations merge into a
newly created entity whose governance structure introduces a material change. Id.
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bundling of voting items outside of the M&A context. 81 The 2014
Interpretation discusses whether the Unbundling Rules are violated in three
distinct situations. We closely examine each situation to ascertain whether
the SEC’s current views are consistent with the preceding judicial and
administrative interpretations.
In the first scenario, corporate management proposed coupling in a
single resolution a reduced dividend on its preferred stock and an extension
of the maturity date. The 2014 Interpretation reasons that both items—the
reduction in dividend and extension of maturity—could be included in a
single vote because “multiple matters that are so ‘inextricably intertwined’
as to effectively constitute a single matter need not be unbundled.”82 Since
both provisions related to “basic financial term[s] of the same series of
capital stock and [each] was the sole consideration for the countervailing
provision,” the SEC viewed the two items as inextricably intertwined and
therefore in need of only a single shareholder vote.83
Even though we agree with the result reached in the first situation
analyzed in the 2014 Interpretation, we are concerned that the SEC did not
choose to cabin its guidance to stock reclassifications and instead rested
solely on a new standard––“inextricably intertwined”––that is ambiguous.
“Inextricable” is defined as that “from which one cannot extricate oneself”
or that which is “incapable of being disentangled, undone, or loosed.”84
Because the rights, privileges, and preferences enjoyed by a class of stock
could, as a theoretical matter, always be serially amended, the use in the
2014 Interpretation of “inextricably” must have meant change, as a
practical matter, whereby the voting stockholders could not reap the
advantage of receiving dividends for a longer term unless the stockholders
also accepted a lower dividend. Even this perspective, however, does not
redeem the ambiguity because the proxy rules expressly permit the board to
condition effectiveness of any approved matter (for example, a longer
duration of the outstanding preferred shares) on the shareholders’ approval
of another matter (for example, the reduced dividend).
Our concern with the generality of the 2014 Interpretation on this
matter is heightened by questioning what the SEC’s position would be
today if confronted with the 1980s’ midstream recapitalizations, discussed
81. U.S. Sec. Exch. Comm’n, Div. of Corp. Fin., Compliance and Disclosure Interpretations:
Exchange Act Rule 14a-4(a)(3), U.S. SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/
guidance/14a-interps.htm (last updated Jan. 24, 2014) [hereinafter 2014 Interpretation].
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Inextricable, THE RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY (rev. ed. 1988).
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earlier, that prompted the adoption of the Unbundling Rules. It would have
been easy to claim that one-time dividend payouts and the issuance of dual
class voting stock are “inextricably intertwined,” and therefore that only
one vote is required. But this result is inconsistent with the forces that
prompted the SEC to adopt the Unbundling Rules, namely the bundling
practices in connection with the dual class recapitalization abuses of the
1980s. Furthermore, it seems inevitable to us that practitioners will claim
many proposals are inextricably intertwined no matter how tenuous the
connections between them. Given that the 1992 rules were adopted in order
to avoid the difficulties in determining whether matters were “related,” the
SEC should not recreate the same type of ambiguity.
A less pernicious approach, and one consistent with the core
philosophy of the Unbundling Rules, is to view the first situation covered
by the 2014 Interpretation narrowly as a “recapitalization” that involves
alteration of existing rights embedded in the preferred shares contract. Such
transactions are legally the same as an exchange transaction in which an
existing bundle of rights, privileges, and preferences enjoyed by a class of
stockholders is swapped for a different bundle of rights, privileges, and
preferences. Moreover, no other class of shares is similarly affected as the
change is isolated to that section of the articles of incorporation wherein the
affected preferred stock contract is defined. This perspective allows the
transaction to be seen as a single matter: the exchange.
The unwieldiness of the unqualified “inextricably intertwined”
standard is illustrated by litigation involving Groupon, where management
sought to increase total authorized shares and to increase the total
allowable allotment to individuals. Because Groupon did separate the
proposals, the Groupon shareholders were able to approve the former, but
not the latter. 85 The approach here shows the benefit of allowing
shareholders to express their position on each of the substantive
components of management’s initiative. Under the 2014 Interpretation,
however, management would have been allowed to bundle in a single
proposal an increase in the total authorized shares with a proposal to
increase individual allotments to managers. This part of the 2014
Interpretation’s “inextricably intertwined” litmus not only confuses this
area of law, but effectively curtails shareholders’ right to vote separately on
each item when the items relate to the same plan of action because
management would generally prefer to bundle the items in a single vote.
This is avoided if the first situation examined in the 2014 Interpretation is
85.

Complaint, supra note 53, at 5–6.
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isolated to instances of share recapitalizations so that the transaction is
understood as an exchange between the corporation and a particular class
of shares whereby a suite of rights, privileges, and preferences are
exchanged for a different bundle of rights, privileges, and preferences.
In the SEC’s second fact pattern, the SEC hypothesizes an instance
where management seeks to amend the corporate charter to establish a par
value for common stock, to eliminate provisions of a series of stock no
longer outstanding that is not subject to further issuance, and to declassify
the board of directors. According to the 2014 Interpretation, no violation is
present because “[t]he staff would not ordinarily object to the bundling of
any number of immaterial matters with a single material matter.”86 This
statement implies that only proposals with at least two material matters
would violate the Unbundling Rules––a conclusion that flies in the face of
the court’s opinion in Greenlight Capital which stated exactly the opposite
standard. An additional concern is whether this norm can be administered
effectively given the difficulty, discussed later, in resolving when a
proposal is material. Finally, this new SEC standard will require courts and
shareholders to carefully examine every item within a potentially long list
of bundled proposals to determine its materiality. This will be time
consuming and generate unnecessary costs.
In the final fact pattern discussed in the 2014 Interpretation,
management seeks to change four aspects of an executive compensation
scheme, including increasing the number of shares available as
compensation, adding restricted stock to the compensation packages, and
extending the term of the plan. The SEC stated that these four proposals
can be bundled: “[T]he staff will not object to the presentation of multiple
changes to an equity incentive plan in a single proposal . . . . This is the
case even if the changes can be characterized as material . . . .”87 Note that
this part of the 2014 Interpretation does not require that these proposals be
“inextricably intertwined.” Rather, it effectively creates a significant carveout from the Unbundling Rules for equity compensation plans. We find it
odd that the SEC would make such a decision without seeking input from
shareholders about the merits of such a carve-out: we question what is so
special about executive compensation voting that it should be exempted
from the Unbundling Rules?
An additional area where the 2014 Interpretation falls short is the
SEC’s discussion of why a firm might want to engage in bundling. The
86.
87.

See 2014 Interpretation, supra note 81.
Id.
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SEC does not consider that the costs saved by combining items, rather than
presenting the items separately, are at most de minimis, as the firm is
already engaged in a proxy solicitation in the first place and will not have
to spend any more effort describing the proposals when they are presented
separately than when they are combined. In other words, the SEC does not
isolate or attempt to analyze the practical benefits of combining items. In
contrast, we believe it fairly apparent what the consequences are for
management and the shareholders of bundling. Simply stated, bundling
may be used by management to distort shareholder choice as well as to
deprive shareholders of the opportunity to communicate their views on
each proposed change. Hence, to recognize and encourage bundling more
widely, as the 2014 Interpretation effectively does, seems contrary to the
Unbundling Rules’ foundation in fundamental notions of fair shareholder
voting without providing any clear benefit. This controversial position is all
the more problematic when reached without considering the nominal
burdens of unbundling.
In all, the SEC’s recent guidance does little more than muddy the
waters, obscuring the line between what must be unbundled and what must
not. The SEC itself appears to be aware that its recent guidance has not
resolved the confusion over bundling—indeed, its efforts to unbundle
resolutions has increased over the past few years: whereas the SEC only
issued twenty-seven comment letters referencing bundling in 2011 and
2012, that number increased to seventy-one in 2013 and 2014.88
In sum, recent actions by the SEC in this area, such as the 2014 and
2015 Interpretations, and an increase in bundling-related comment letters,
suggest that the SEC is taking an increased interest in impermissible
bundling. Nonetheless, the SEC’s attempts have thus far been
unsuccessful—the recent guidance has been unclear and has further
muddied the water in this important area. Further, its recent guidance
provides ample opportunity for managers to bundle management88. Jim Moloney, Cem Surmeli & Erin Cho, Unbundling Proposals After the Holidays, DEAL
LAW., Jan.–Feb. 2016, at 6–7. For an example of an SEC comment letter referencing impermissible
bundling, see Letter from Kristina Arberg, Sec. Exch. Comm’n, to Christoper J. Vohs, Chief
Accounting Officer, Bluerock Residential Growth REIT, Inc. (Dec. 23, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/1442626/000000000013069990/filename1.pdf (“We note that proposal number 1
is seeking shareholder approval to make multiple amendments to the charter, including, but not limited
to, adding two new classes of common stock with different rights. Please revise your proxy statement to
unbundle the proposed amendments into separate proposals as appropriate.”). Although such comment
letters can help to minimize bundling, we note many obvious examples of bundling did not receive SEC
comment letters. For example, none of the bundling examples provided in Part III received SEC
comment letters referencing the bundled proposals.
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entrenching amendments on the backs of items more likely to receive
shareholder approval.
C. PROXY ADVISORS AND BUNDLING
Another place where we might find a careful analysis of the
Unbundling Rules is in the voting policies of third party voting advisors,
such as ISS and Glass Lewis. Proxy advisors analyze all of the
management proposals and provide voting recommendations to their
institutional investor clients. Consequently, their voting policies have an
important effect on shareholder votes. 89 In Greenlight Capital, the court
recognized that proxy advisors had issued voting recommendations on the
contested proposals. One of those voting services had found that “[Apple]
has elected to bundle multiple article amendments into a single proposal, a
practice which we believe negatively affects shareholders as it prevents
them from judging each amendment on its own merits.” 90 The fact that
these voting advisors believed that these proposals were being bundled
appears to have influenced the court’s decision against Apple.
Because of the central role that proxy advisors play in the shareholder
voting process, we examine the policies with respect to bundling of the two
dominant advisors, ISS and Glass Lewis. While sometimes criticizing the
bundling of management proposals in its reports,91 ISS does not have a
policy to recommend against a management proposal just because of its
bundled nature.92 Instead, their 2015 proxy voting guidelines state:
Vote case-by-case on bundled or ‘conditional’ proxy proposals. In the
case of items that are conditioned upon each other, examine the benefits
and costs of the packaged items. In instances when the joint effect of the
conditioned items is not in shareholders’ best interests, vote against the
proposals. If the combined effect is positive, support such proposals.93
89. James Cotter, Alan Palmiter & Randall Thomas, ISS Recommendations and Mutual Fund
Voting on Proxy Proposals, 55 VILL. L. REV. 1, 6–8 (2010).
90. Greenlight Capital, L.P. v. Apple, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24716, at *24 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
22, 2013).
91. For example, ISS notes in one report that “[b]undled proposals can leave shareholders with
an all-or-nothing choice, skewing power disproportionately towards the board and away from
shareholders.” INST’L S’HOLDER SERVS. (USA), PROXY REPORT REGARDING FIRSTMERIT CORP. 11
(Apr. 3, 2007). Similarly, ISS notes in another report that “[i]t is best corporate governance practice that
the company submit key amendments independent of one another and not bundle multiple amendments
into one item” INST’L S’HOLDER SERVS. (USA), PROXY REPORT REGARDING HOLLY CORP. 8 (June 14,
2011) [hereinafter HOLLY CORP.].
92. In fact, as discussed in Part III, ISS reports rarely explicitly highlight the bundled nature of
the proposal.
93. INST’L S’HOLDER SERVS. (USA), SUMMARY PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES: 2015
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In sum, ISS’s policies state that it will recommend “for” the bundled
proposal if the net effect of the different items is perceived as beneficial to
shareholders and “against” if the net effect is perceived as detrimental to
shareholders.
In practice, however, ISS’s actual recommendations do not always
match its stated policy, perhaps highlighting the challenge of consistently
implementing such a policy. We find that ISS sometimes recommends
“against” if any of the bundled items would get an “against”
recommendation on a stand-alone basis. This implies a negative
recommendation if there is a “bad” item in the bundle, no matter how many
other items are “good.” For example, in the ISS report on Holly
Corporation’s management proposals in 2011, ISS states: “In analyzing
bundled proposals, ISS will recommend AGAINST a proposal if any one
of the bundled issues is not in the best interests of shareholders.”94 Either
way, both the ISS stated policy and its application seem inconsistent with
the judicial decisions and SEC interpretations discussed above; the courts
and even the 2014 Interpretation deem bundling unlawful when two or
more material items are joined, regardless of their perceived impact on
shareholder rights. We believe the proxy advisors’ practice of assessing
whether the bundled material matters yield a net benefit has the same shaky
wisdom as being a little bit misleading in one’s material statements.
As for Glass Lewis, we did not find any mention of bundling in the
Glass Lewis 2011 95 and 2013 96 Proxy Paper Guidelines, suggesting that
Glass Lewis may not have had an explicit policy on bundling. In the 2015
guidelines, we found the following:
 If a board seeks shareholder approval of a forum selection clause as
BENCHMARK POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 32 (updated Mar. 4, 2015), http://www.issgovernance.com/
file/policy/2015-us-summary-voting-guidelines-updated.pdf. The same language has been repeated in
the Summary Proxy Voting Guidelines every year since 2003, the first year for which we have ISS
guidelines. The only other mention of bundling in the ISS 2015 proxy voting guidelines is in the context
of anti-greenmail proposals and essentially is just an example of this general policy: “Vote case-by-case
on anti-greenmail proposals when they are bundled with other charter or bylaw amendments.” Id. at 24.
94. HOLLY CORP., supra note 91, at 8. See also INST’L S’HOLDER SERVS. (USA), PROXY REPORT
REGARDING HAWAIIAN ELECTRIC INDUSTRIES, INC. 15 (Apr. 16, 2009) (“[ISS’s] policy regarding
bundled proposals is to support the entire bundled proposal only if [ISS] would support each individual
part of the bundled proposal on a standalone basis.”); INST’L S’HOLDER SERVS. (USA), PROXY REPORT
REGARDING INTERSIL CORP. 15–16 (May 11, 2005) (“ISS will analyze the following proposal as a
bundled proposal. If one of the items brought to vote under the amendment receives an against vote
recommendation, then we will recommend an against vote regarding the entire proposal.”).
95. GLASS LEWIS & CO., LLC (USA), PROXY PAPER GUIDELINES: 2011 PROXY SEASON: AN
OVERVIEW OF THE GLASS LEWIS APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL PROXY ADVICE (2011).
96. GLASS LEWIS & CO., LLC (USA), PROXY PAPER GUIDELINES: 2013 PROXY SEASON: AN
OVERVIEW OF THE GLASS LEWIS APPROACH TO PROXY ADVICE (2012).
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part of a bundled proposal rather than as a separate proposal, Glass
Lewis will “weigh the importance of the other bundled provisions
when determining the vote recommendation on the proposal.”97
 Glass Lewis will recommend against the chairman of the governance
committee if the board is currently seeking shareholder approval of a
forum selection clause as part of a bundled proposal rather than as a
separate proposal.98

Based on the above, it seems that Glass Lewis does not have a general
policy on bundling, and even these specific applications were introduced
into its guidelines only recently.
If we can extrapolate from the exclusive forum case shown above, it
appears that Glass Lewis’s general policy is to assess the overall net effect
of bundled proposals; this mirrors ISS’s approach. As we noted with ISS,
this is not consistent with the judicial and SEC authority discussed above.
Because of the similarity in the ISS and Glass Lewis policies, in the
empirical analysis in Part V, the cases of bundling where Glass Lewis and
ISS recommendations differ will be examples of how the two proxy
advisors made that “net effect” assessment differently, further highlighting
the difficulty in administering this policy consistently.
In our eyes, the third party voting advisors should have clear policies
against bundling violations that comply with the courts’ decisions in
Koppel and Greenlight Capital. If they find that a proposal is improperly
bundled, then they should automatically issue a negative voting
recommendation. We believe this approach would have the salutary effect
of both highlighting the existence of bundling and reducing its incidence.
Proxy advisors’ current standards and their application not only muddy the
waters, but may well encourage bundling when managers believe the
coupled proposals can be seen as yielding a net benefit. And their inherent
ambiguity introduces costs and uncertainty into their operations, which
does not benefit their clientele and likely raises their operating costs.
Proxy advisors, by basing their decision on whether bundled material
items yield a “net benefit” are guiding their recommendations by a maxim
“no harm, no foul.” Whatever reasoning supports the maxim, it is not
appropriate in this context. The proxy advisors’ net benefit approach is at
97. GLASS LEWIS & CO., LLC (USA), PROXY PAPER GUIDELINES: 2015 PROXY SEASON: AN
OVERVIEW OF THE GLASS LEWIS APPROACH TO PROXY ADVICE 39 (2015), http://www.glasslewis.com/
assets/uploads/2013/12/2015_GUIDELINES_United_States.pdf.
98. Id. at 14.
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odds with Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., where, as seen earlier, the
Supreme Court held a material omission violates the proxy rules regardless
of the fairness of the particular transaction the shareholders are asked to
approve.99 We believe the proxy advisors’ net benefit approach to bundling
is even more invidious than the case posed in Mills because their practice
essentially licenses managers to remove the shareholder vote on any
separate matter needing their approval so long as managers deftly join that
matter with a higher-valued matter. Clearly a “foul” exists here as well as a
proscribed harm.
While drawing the line between bundled and unbundled proposals is
occasionally difficult, the vast number of instances of bundling are easily
detected. Moreover, proxy advisors are the most experienced shareholder
representatives in spotting bundling issues. As we show in the next
sections, most improperly bundled proposals can be (and are) uncovered by
applying several basic rules.
III. DISTINGUISHING AMONG BUNDLES OF BUNDLING
Having reviewed the main authoritative sources interpreting the
Unbundling Rules, we now describe four different criteria to identify
bundled management proposals. As will be seen, our criteria for each of the
four analytical groups are shaped by the distinct public policy implications
posed by each of the forms that bundling can take. We consider the
following potential definitions of bundling: “generic bundling,” “material
bundling,” “multiple material bundling,” and “negative bundling.” As a
prelude, we point out that our four groups are ordered here so that the most
inclusive group, generic bundling, appears first, and as we move to other
categories the bundling criteria tightens so that fewer instances are
reported.100
A. GENERIC BUNDLING
We define as “generic bundling” cases where multiple proposals are
aggregated on the proxy card so that a shareholder casts but a single vote
99. Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 381–83 (1970).
100. To elaborate, generic bundling appears first because it includes all bundling observations
falling within the next three categories plus any non-material bundled proposals. Material bundling
collects all the instances of single and multiple material proposals that are bundled, including negative
bundling, but excludes non-material bundled items that would be included only within the general
bundling rubric. Similarly, multiple material bundling is less inclusive than material bundling, as the
material bundling category collects both single and multiple bundled proposals. Finally, the least
inclusive category is negative bundling, which includes only those resolutions within material or
multiple material bundling in which at least one proposal negatively impacts shareholders.
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for all the proposals (regardless of whether the individual items are viewed
as material and regardless of whether their perceived effect on shareholders
is positive or negative). Hence, this is the broadest definition of bundling,
and this type of bundling is also the easiest standard to apply for empirical
research (or for that matter enforcement) as it only requires us to count
whether more than one proposal is to be acted upon through a single
shareholder vote.
Generic bundling does not necessarily violate the Unbundling Rules.
As noted earlier in the discussion of Greenlight Capital, bundling together
“‘ministerial or technical matters’ that do not alter substantive shareholder
rights” is generally permitted.101 Nonetheless, both Koppel and Greenlight
Capital, relying on the Adopting Release, not only interpret the
Unbundling Rules to require that “separate matters” be put to separate
votes, but in doing so expressed a strong preference for more voting items
rather than fewer.102 What constitutes a separate item is a matter for state
law, or absent such law, is a question of fact to be determined from the
underlying corporate documents.103 Hence, it is important to examine the
frequency with which generic bundling occurs. Such frequency defines the
universe of potential bundling violations because in principle each item in
the bundled proposal could be a “separate matter.”
We raise here the view that generic bundling of items that are
admittedly technical and ministerial is not beyond concern. As we move
through the next three analytical categories of bundling, we parse generic
bundling further as we explore whether managers systematically exploit the
law’s ambiguities. The frequency with which we find generic bundling
piques this inquiry, as does the fact that each item in the bundled proposal
could be a “separate matter.” That is, if items of any significance could be
easily separated so that the shareholders are thereby empowered to vote
effectively on each item so separated, why do we find the opposite––
pervasive clustering of seemingly unrelated items? To resolve this
question, we separately analyze the materiality of each proposal grouped
101. Greenlight Capital, L.P. v. Apple, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24716, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
22, 2013) (quoting THOMAS & DIXON, supra note 62, at 9-23, 9-24). Proposal 3 from Loews
Corporation’s 2009 meeting is an example of a bundled proposal including only technical or ministerial
items. Loews Corp., Definitive Proxy Statement (DEF 14A), at 23–24 (Apr. 7, 2009),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/60086/000006008609000013/proxy2009final.htm. This
proposal requested permission to simplify and update the charter by revising the purpose clause and
eliminating unnecessary provisions relating to outdated stock.
102. See Koppel v. 4987 Corp., 167 F.3d 125, 138 (2d Cir. 1999); Greenlight Capital, L.P. v.
Apple, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24716, at *13–14 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2013).
103. Id.
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with others in the same resolution as well as the substantive impact on
shareholders of each material proposal that is bundled. With these further
refinements, described below, a sharper image of the frequency and
perniciousness of bundling is presented.
B. MATERIAL BUNDLING
A higher threshold than generic bundling for a violation of the
Unbundling Rules requires that the management proposal include at least
one material item bundled with other technical or material items. To
operationalize this threshold, we define as “material bundling” the subset of
generic bundling where at least one of the items in the bundled proposal is
material.
One challenge with this definition of bundling is that it requires a
decision maker to determine if a particular management resolution contains
at least one material proposal. In our empirical analysis, to assess whether a
certain proposal would materially affect shareholder rights, we rely on the
current view of best practices in corporate governance as reflected in
various corporate governance ratings, proxy voting advisor
recommendations, and voting policies of major institutional investors,104
such as the Council for Institutional Investors. Moreover, in Greenlight
Capital, the court interpreted the fact that proxy advisory services had
themselves noted that two material proposals were bundled together to be
further evidence that those proposals were bundled.105 Hence, to aid in our
materiality assessment, when available, we also read proxy advisors’
analysis of the items contained in the bundled proposals.
As an example of this type of bundling, consider the 2005 annual
meeting of MKS Instruments, Inc., which asked shareholders to cast a
single up-or-down vote on a single group that contained six bylaw
amendments, claiming that the amendments were “primarily to reflect”
various changes to Massachusetts corporate law.106 While some of these
104. We note that our resort to objective evidence in the form of best practices is consistent with
the materiality standard customarily invoked in regulatory and enforcement matters. See, e.g., TSC
Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (“A[] . . . fact is material if there is a
substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to
vote . . . . It does not require proof of a substantial likelihood that disclosure of the . . . fact would have
caused the reasonable investor to change his vote.”). A proposal of the type fitting within such
documented best practices is a matter that typically causes at least pause on the reasonable
shareholder’s part before casting a vote on that matter.
105. Greenlight Capital, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24716, at *21.
106. INST’L S’HOLDER SERVS. (USA), PROXY REPORT REGARDING MKS INSTRUMENTS, INC. 8–9
(2005).
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amendments did in fact reflect such changes (and may be viewed as
technical items), at least one proposed bylaw amendment—to permit
directors unilaterally to amend provisions relating to the removal of
directors without shareholder approval—would result in a material (and
arguably adverse) change to shareholders’ rights that did not appear
required by the statutory change. ISS highlighted “the bundled nature of
this proposal” and recommended against its approval because of this
amendment.107
The MKS Instruments proxy is an example where (at least) one
material item within a bundled proposal was accompanied by several other
purportedly ministerial and technical amendments. This bundled resolution
violated the standard set forth in Greenlight Capital, but not the 2014
Interpretation. But, perhaps more importantly, it also illustrates the
significant difficulties facing shareholders under the standard set forth in
the 2014 Interpretation proposal. In order to determine if the six bylaw
amendments grouped within a single resolution were material, a
shareholder (or their advisor) would need to: (1) carefully read each of the
six amendments, (2) determine if—without reference to other bodies of
law—any of the six changes was material, (3) consult an attorney to
determine if any changes to Massachusetts or federal law made an
otherwise material proposal merely technical or ministerial, and then
(4) determine how many of the proposed changes materially affected
shareholder rights. Only after completing all of these steps could an
investor (or their voting advisor) determine if this single proposal violated
the Unbundling Rules. Given the complexity of this process, and the
inherent subjectivity of the inquiry entailed, it is likely that different
shareholders and different proxy advisors would reach different
conclusions.108
As discussed below, we recommend that companies be required at
least to present each separate material proposal as a single voting item.
That is, we recommend that our definition of “material bundling” be used
as the standard for impermissible bundling (consistent with the standard set
forth in Greenlight Capital). 109 Although our recommendation is
inconsistent with the SEC’s 2014 Interpretation, which rejects the approach
107. Id.
108. See infra Part IV for data on the differences in voting recommendations on bundled proposals
among proxy advisors.
109. Greenlight Capital, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24716, at *21–22 (“Permitting Apple to bundle
numerous ‘technical’ matters with a single material matter would appear to still violate the letter of the
law . . . .” (emphasis added)).
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taken in Greenlight Capital by concluding that the joinder of a single
material proposal with several ministerial and technical proposals does not
violate the Unbundling Rules,110 we believe the SEC’s 2014 Interpretation
is inconsistent with the animating objectives of the Unbundling Rules as
well as in conflict with corporate law.
We believe such a standard is necessary because if companies are
instead permitted to combine a material proposal and a constellation of
other proposals as a single voting item, as condoned by the 2014
Interpretation, the rule becomes very difficult for the SEC to administer
and for shareholders and proxy advisors to intelligently apply. By
interpreting the Unbundling Rules to at least require each material proposal
to be separately voted upon, the Unbundling Rules will be applied so as to
avoid trivializing state corporate law provisions that compel shareholder
approval of a matter even if that matter is recognized to be technical and
ministerial.111
We in fact recommend that bundling concerns be broader than the
court’s position in Greenlight Capital. The court’s conclusion that a single
material proposal when joined with admittedly technical or ministerial
items violated the Unbundling Rules implies that if only technical or
ministerial proposals are combined there is no violation. One basis for
believing this creates bad policy is that carving out an exception to the
Unbundling Rules for the joinder of solely technical and ministerial
proposals raises difficult and likely unmanageable interpretative problems
in the SEC’s oversight of the rule. Because thousands of proxy statements
descend on the SEC, generally during the crowded two or three month
“proxy season,” concerns for the administrability of an interpretation is a
desideratum. At a minimum, difficulty in ascertaining for a particular
company whether the grouped proposals are all technical or ministerial
supports a prophylaxis whereby a thumb is placed on the scale consistent
with Koppel’s observation that over-inclusion is better than underinclusion.112 This approach is all the more compelling in light of the fact
that separate presentation of proposals entail no marginal cost and, if for
110. 2014 Interpretation, supra note 81.
111. We believe that the SEC can adopt guidelines for enforcement of its Unbundling Rules so
that, as a purely internal matter, the SEC can exercise prosecutorial discretion while at the same time
continuing to administer its selective review of proxy statements in a manner consistent with our
recommendations. In the end, its administration of the Unbundling Rules, similar to its position in the
administration of the proxy rules overall, should be to facilitate governance by compelling separate
presentation of even technical and ministerial proposals.
112. Koppel v. 4987 Corp., 167 F.2d 125, 138 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing Communications Release,
supra note 3, at 48,287).
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some reason there is the belief on management’s part that approval of each
proposal is necessary to achieve an important outcome, as seen earlier, the
proxy rules expressly permit conditioning any approval on the approval of
other separately voted on matters. Our call for a prophylactic response is
further supported by our findings regarding not just the frequency of
bundling of material items, but that clustered among bundled items are
material items that are harmful to shareholders.
A further reason to disallow bundling of technical and ministerial
proposals is that this type of bundling conflicts with the purposes
underlying the Unbundling Rules as well as basic corporate law. As relied
upon in Greenlight Capital, the Unbundling Rules’ purpose was not solely
to rid the proxy statement of distorted choices. As set forth in the Adopting
Release, the Unbundling Rules facilitate shareholders’ communication of
their views on matters requiring their approval. 113 On this point, it is
significant that the Unbundling Rules speak in terms of “separate items” as
contrasted with the more ubiquitous material standard that customarily
guides disclosures in SEC documents. The litmus used for the Unbundling
Rules suggests an approach to the Rules’ interpretation that is not less
inclusive than whether shareholders would attach significance to the matter
when deciding how to vote.114 But there are considerations aside from the
importance the proposal may assume to the reasonable shareholder.
Consider that, if the board is seeking shareholder approval of a matter
that is indeed technical or ministerial, there must be some legal compulsion
for the board to seek approval. The board cannot be expected to submit
proposals to shareholders if the board has the legal authority to act without
shareholder approval. 115 The board submits technical and ministerial
proposals to the shareholder because the matter is in the charter and beyond
the power of the board of directors to act alone to change.116 Thus, as a
matter of state law, corporate law does not quiet or ignore the voice of the
113. Communications Release, supra note 3, at 48,287.
114. See supra note 104 (discussing the standard of materiality).
115. An important qualification to this would be an instance where some element of self-interest
drives the board to obtain the cleansing influence of the disinterested shareholder approval. See DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2016); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.63 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2007).
116. The Model Business Corporation Act allows the board to act in very limited instances to
remove some inconsequential items, for example, remove “Corporation” from its name, in the charter
without shareholder approval. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.05. Because nearly half of all public
companies are incorporated in Delaware, and thus the vast preponderance of the companies subject to
the SEC proxy rules are Delaware companies, it is significant that the Delaware statute does not
similarly authorize the board to undertake any change in the charter without stockholder approval after
shares have been issued. Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 241, with id. § 242.
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shareholders on matters solely because management makes an ex ante
determination that the item is technical or ministerial. We therefore believe
it is inappropriate that Greenlight and the SEC permit the Unbundling
Rules to be interpreted in a manner inconsistent with state corporate law.
Our concern is even greater with the SEC’s embrace of the view that
matters management deems technical and ministerial can be presented for a
single vote with a proposal acknowledged to be material in its own right.
Certainly these positions are difficult to justify on the basis of cost when
separate voting entails no marginal cost.
C. MULTIPLE MATERIAL BUNDLING
Our third classification of bundling arises where two or more material
proposals are joined in a single resolution to be voted upon by the
shareholders. Using the approach described in the preceding section, a
proposal’s materiality is determined in light of contemporary views of
governance ratings, proxy advisors, and institutional investors. If there are
two or more material proposals that are bundled, there seems to be no
dispute that aggregating them into one single voting item will violate the
Unbundling Rules.117
One example of what we define as multiple material bundling is
Proposal Number 3 from the June 2005 annual shareholders’ meeting of
Majesco Entertainment. Majesco’s management proposed, among other
things, that its shareholders approve a restatement of its entire certificate of
incorporation to add several strong antitakeover provisions. 118 These
included: a classified board of directors, a prohibition on shareholder action
by written consent, a limitation that directors could be removed only for
cause, certain supermajority voting provisions, and a provision providing
that the company would not opt out of the Delaware antitakeover statute.119
ISS noted the tremendous antitakeover force of these changes and
recommended that shareholders vote against the proposal (the “net effect”
assessment was simple in this case because ISS viewed all the provisions as
adversely affecting shareholder rights).120 However, because management
117. Even Apple appears to have conceded this point in Greenlight Capital. See Greenlight
Capital, L.P. v. Apple, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24716, at *19 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2013). The one
exception to the rule would be the carve-out in the 2014 Interpretation for executive compensation
plans. See 2014 Interpretation, supra note 81.
118. Majesco Entm’t Co., Definitive Proxy Statement (DEF 14A), at 27–29 (May 9, 2005),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1076682/000095013605002626/file001.htm.
119. Id.
120. INST’L S’HOLDER SERVS. (USA), PROXY REPORT REGARDING MAJESCO ENTERTAINMENT
CO. 17–19 (2005).
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(the Sutton family) controlled 36.3 percent of the company’s voting
stock,121 it is not surprising that the proposal passed.122
Under the test in Greenlight Capital, this constitutes a blatant
violation of the Unbundling Rules. In that case, the court held that
“management may not propose several, aggregated charter amendments ‘by
treating them . . . as [one] vote on the restatement of corporate
documents’ . . . .” 123 This type of proposal shows why enforcing the
Unbundling Rules is important.124
Another example is when, in 2008, ITT Corporation asked
shareholders to approve an amendment to its certificate of incorporation
that would simultaneously increase the number of its authorized shares of
common stock by 100 percent and amend the company’s bylaws to provide
for majority voting for directors in uncontested elections. 125 These are
material, but unrelated, matters; combining the two of them together in a
single proposal violates the Unbundling Rules, as in the Majesco
Entertainment example. Despite this impermissible bundling that presented
a distorted choice, ISS did not recommend an “against” vote, explaining
that the majority voting amendment was shareholder-friendly under the
circumstances126 and that the increase in authorized shares was “below the
allowable threshold” for which ISS typically casts a skeptical eye.127
A special case of multiple material bundling—and one that most
distorts shareholders’ choice—occurs when one (or more) material
proposal(s) that benefits shareholders is combined with one (or more)
material proposal(s) that adversely affects shareholders. The dual class
recapitalizations of the 1980s, discussed earlier, exhibited these
characteristics. In a more recent time period, consider the example of Life
Technologies Corporation. In April 2011, ISS published a report to its
121. Majesco Entm’t Co., supra note 118, at 5.
122. Majesco Entm’t Co., Current Report (Form 8-K) (June 13, 2005), https://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/1076682/000095013605003559/file001.htm.
123. Greenlight Capital, L.P. v. Apple, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24716, at *14–15 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 22, 2013) (quoting THOMAS & DIXON, supra note 62, at 9-23, 9-24).
124. This proposal is not an isolated occurrence of this type of behavior. For example, Schnitzer
Steel Industries held a special meeting in 2006 to amend the company’s charter to incorporate a host of
antitakeover defenses and bundled all of the amendments into a single proposal. INST’L S’HOLDER
SERVS. (USA), PROXY REPORT REGARDING SCHNITZER STEEL INDUS., INC. 5–6 (May 25, 2006).
125. INST’L S’HOLDER SERVS. (USA), PROXY REPORT TO ITT CORP. 13–14 (Apr. 21, 2008).
126. The report does not disclose whether shareholder approval of the bylaw amendment was
necessary. See id. For example, if the directors had the power to amend the bylaws unilaterally, then
including this item in the proposal was unnecessary and likely calculated to favorably influence the
shareholder vote on the increase in authorized shares.
127. Id. at 14.
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clients about Life Technologies Corporation’s upcoming annual meeting at
which there were several voting items on the ballot. Of particular interest
for our purposes is Item 8 of the proxy statement, where corporate
management sought in a single proposal to amend the company’s
certificate of incorporation to declassify its board of directors, adopt an
exclusive venue provision for shareholder suits under Delaware law, and
remove some provisions relating to a particular series of preferred stock.128
Beginning with an item-by-item analysis, the ISS report first found that
board declassification proposals would substantially increase board
accountability to shareholders and hence should be supported by
shareholders.129 With respect to the exclusive venue provision, however, it
recommended negative shareholder action unless the company had in place
best practices in corporate governance, which Life Technologies did not at
that time.130 Finally, with respect to the preferred stock proposal, ISS felt it
would have effectively led to the authorization of blank stock preferred
stock, which the company could use for anti-takeover purposes; ISS viewed
the proposed changes to the preferred shares negatively.131
Life Technologies’ 2011 proxy statement appears to be a clear case
where corporate management sought shareholder approval of three material
items, two adversely affecting shareholder rights and one beneficial to
shareholder rights, by bundling the three together with a single box on the
ballot. Under any of the legal standards discussed above, this resolution in
Life Technologies’ proxy statement violated the Unbundling Rules.
Nevertheless, in line with its stated policy on voting on bundled items, ISS
recommended to shareholders that they vote in favor of this item. It stated,
“given that these [preferred stock and exclusive venue] proposals are
bundled with a declassification proposal that would substantially increase
board accountability and give greater effect to the shareholder franchise,
we recommend that shareholders vote FOR this bundled proposal.”132 It did
qualify this statement by noting that in the future it might issue a negative
voting recommendation if an issuer bundled an exclusive venue provision
with any other proposal.133
When the ballots were counted, only 0.7 percent of shareholder votes
128. Life Technologies Corp., Definitive Proxy Statement (DEF 14A), at 47–50 (Mar. 18, 2011),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1073431/000095012311026578/a58520dedef14a.htm.
129. INST’L S’HOLDER SERVS. (USA), PROXY REPORT REGARDING LIFE TECHNOLOGIES CORP. 11
(Apr. 11, 2012).
130. Id. at 10–11.
131. Id. at 10.
132. Id. at 11.
133. Id.

2016]

QUIETING THE SHAREHOLDERS’ VOICE

1217

were against the proposal. 134 As developed in Part V, this outcome is
consistent with the proposal receiving a positive ISS voting
recommendation, despite its obvious violation of the Unbundling Rules.
The clear implication of the ISS voting report is that ISS would not have
recommended in favor of two of the three items bundled together if they
had been presented to shareholders separately. This example clearly
highlights the inconsistency between ISS voting recommendations and the
Unbundling Rules as well as the destructive effect of bundling on
shareholders’ voices.
Cases of bundling combining a “positive” and a “negative” item, such
as Life Technologies, are interesting because they capture the type of
bundling that most distorts shareholders’ choices by forcing shareholders to
accept an item that they would not approve on a stand-alone basis in
exchange for the approval of another item they favor. However, it is
important to emphasize that it is not necessary that a single proposal
aggregate material positive and negative items to violate the Unbundling
Rules. Aside from the fact that shareholders may differ in their assessment
of what is “positive” and “negative” (as Greenlight Capital indicates), and
can likewise be expected to disagree as to the magnitude of any perceived
negative or positive effect, the court in Greenlight Capital rejected Apple’s
claim that only intentional “coercive manipulation” through bundling by
management is forbidden. There, the court noted that this form of
manipulation of shareholder voting is only one “evil” addressed by the
Unbundling Rules.135 We emphasize that the Unbundling Rules are also
directed toward permitting shareholders to communicate their views to the
board of directors on each matter put to a vote, and that purpose is defeated
by bundling material proposals together. 136 Hence, any management
proposal with two or more material items contained in it—for example, any
case we define as multiple material bundling—will violate the Unbundling
Rules, regardless of whether those items are positive or negative.
D. NEGATIVE BUNDLING
Our fourth classification of bundling entails identifying instances in
which multiple material proposals are bundled with at least one proposal
134. This data is derived from the ISS Voting Analytics Database. Voting Analytics, ISS,
https://www.issgovernance.com/solutions/iss-analytics/voting-analytics/ (data set on file with authors).
135. Greenlight Capital, L.P. v. Apple, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24716, at *22–23 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 22, 2013).
136. See supra text accompanying note 38.
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that negatively affects shareholders’ rights. 137 In this classification we
examine each material item and assess whether it results in an
augmentation or diminution of shareholder rights.
Assessing the likely positive or negative effect of a material proposal
is highly fact specific. In many instances, we could determine a proposal’s
positive or negative impact using the same third party sources previously
employed to assess the materiality of the bundled items. Nonetheless, in
making this assessment, we quickly discovered that the unique factual
setting not only mattered, but mattered a good deal. For example, consider
the facts in Greenlight Capital, where among the four proposals bundled
was an amendment to the charter to eliminate the board’s blank stock
authority.138 In some settings, and certainly before the advent of the poison
pill defensive maneuver, a blank stock provision was touted as valueincreasing as it enables the board to nimbly craft the terms of a preferred
stock offering to meet the momentary expectations of investors who would
be expected to purchase the preferred shares and thereby flush the
corporation’s treasury with cash. In the mid-1980s, this prince became a
frog as boards regularly drew upon its blank stock authority to issue rights
which were central to the poison pill defensive maneuver.139 In the case of
Apple, the blank stock provision was the means by which the activist
shareholder, Greenlight Capital, sought to force the Apple board to
distribute significant sums of cash that it believed Apple was needlessly
hoarding. The distribution would have occurred through a special class of
dividend preferred that the board could issue pursuant to its blank stock
authority.140 Thus, in this context, through a hedge fund’s “kiss,” the frog is
restored to being a prince.
A further example of the idiosyncratic feature of positive and negative
characterizations of a material proposal’s effects is the ex ante effects of a
super majority voting requirement. Many of the instances we observe of
multiple material bundling involve changes in charter or bylaw provisions
reducing a supermajority vote needed to amend the charter, to merge the
firm, or to sell the firm. Such changes can be seen as positive, as a lower
137. In defining what is negative, we rely on the current view of best practices in corporate
governance, as reflected in various corporate governance ratings, proxy voting advisor
recommendations, and voting policies of major institutional investors, such as the Council for
Institutional Investors.
138. Greenlight Capital, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24716, at *4.
139. See Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1351–54 (Del. 1985) (describing the
process and authority for creating poison pills via the board’s blank stock authority).
140. Greenlight Capital, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24716, at *5–6.
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vote necessarily introduces a quality prized in commerce, greater flexibility
and ease of accomplishing a transaction; a lower voting threshold to be
acquired can also lead to the firm being acquired at an above-market
price.141 On the other hand, these positive effects are not present if the firm
has a substantial block holder.142
Our point is not to argue that changes in supermajority voting
requirements are inherently nefarious. Our point is more modest: it is
difficult to assess the positive or negative effects of such a change, but not
difficult to understand that each change is itself material.
One example of negative bundling is Proposal Number 2 from BB&T
Corporation’s 2004 annual meeting. The proposal sought to make the four
following amendments to BB&T’s bylaws: (1) declassify the board,
(2) allow for removal of directors with or without cause, (3) enhance the
ability of the board to fill vacancies, and (4) allow the board to amend the
bylaws without a shareholder vote.143 While the first two items increase
shareholder rights, the third and fourth items restrict shareholder rights. In
particular, the third item would have allowed a majority of the board to fill
vacancies, including vacancies created because shareholders removed the
director in question, while the fourth item would have allowed the board to
bypass shareholders when making changes to the bylaws. This bundling
incident also illustrates the difficulty proxy advisory services face in
determining the overall net effect of a proposal. ISS ultimately decided to
recommend against this proposal because “the potential negative impact of
the proposed third and fourth amendments to the bylaws outweighs the
benefits of an annual board and the increased accountability of
directors.” 144 However, Glass Lewis, which presumably also bases its
recommendations on a proposal’s net effect, recommended that
141. See, e.g., Audra Boone, Brian Broughman & Antonio J. Macias, The Cost of Supermajority
Target Shareholder Approval: Mergers Versus Tender Offers (Ind. Legal Studies Research Paper No.
331, 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2629424 (finding statistically significant evidence that
supermajority voting requirements impact the form of acquisitions).
142. For example, a pre-existing 20 percent owner whose ability to amend the charter or to merge
or sell the firm is greatly facilitated by the concomitant lowering of the number of shares the block
holder must persuade to its cause.
143. BB&T Corp., Definitive Proxy Statement (DEF 14A), at 7–10 (Mar. 24, 2004),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/92230/000119312504044964/ddef14a.htm#toc14357_4. Note
that Majesco Entertainment, Life Technologies, and, arguably, ITT Corporation (depending on how one
views the proposal to increase the number of authorized shares of common stock) are also examples of
negative bundling in that in each of these cases at least one item in the bundle was material and
adversely affected shareholder rights. See supra notes 118–129 and accompanying text.
144. INST’L S’HOLDER SERVS. (USA), PROXY REPORT REGARDING BB&T CORP. 14 (undated).
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shareholders vote in favor of the proposal.145
The idea behind this category is that proposals that negatively affect
shareholder rights are more likely to constitute abusive bundling instances
and should therefore be viewed as more egregious violations of the
Unbundling Rules. That is, including a proposal with distinctly negative
effects on shareholder rights with material proposals that have positive
effects entails the classic distorted choice that catapulted initial interest in
the Unbundling Rules. The Unbundling Rules and their construction has
moved past this narrow, albeit most harmful, type of bundling. It is
important to reiterate that, for purposes of the Unbundling Rules, it does
not matter whether the bundled proposals are individually positive or
negative, or if their joinder overall yields positive or negative effects.
Greenlight Capital holds that the rules are not solely directed toward
proposals that are intentionally coercive in management’s view because
what is and what is not “pro-shareholder” is for the shareholders to
decide.146 Even a proposal that is labeled positive by some shareholders
may not be positive from the perspective of other shareholders, so that even
proposals with bundled items that are typically viewed as pro-shareholder
may decrease shareholders’ right to vote separately on each item. In this
way, the Unbundling Rules are neutral regarding the desirable effects of
individual proposals in that shareholders are empowered to make their own
determination regarding a proposal’s effects for each separately presented
proposal.
However, as we will discuss in Part V, this classification is useful in
identifying the subsample of bundled proposals that are more likely to
receive negative recommendations from third party proxy voting services.
That is, as we will see, proxy advisor firms appear to gauge their
recommendation on what the advisor believes to be the aggregate impact of
the bundled proposals rather than to take a principled position that bundling
of material items calls for a negative recommendation. Given their apparent
policies of recommending against a bundled proposal only when the net
effect is negative, ISS and Glass Lewis will consider making a negative
recommendation only if there is at least one item in the bundle that has a
material adverse effect on shareholder rights. Hence, the subset of negative
bundled proposals may be viewed as an upper bound of the number of
cases where ISS and Glass Lewis may conclude that the net effect of the
145. See supra text accompanying note 98.
146. Greenlight Capital, L.P. v. Apple, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24716, at *22–23 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 22, 2013).
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bundled proposal is negative and thus issue a negative recommendation.
Later we question whether the aggregate impact approach that is taken by
ISS and Glass Lewis is either principled or defensible.
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: FREQUENCY OF BUNDLING
Having developed our four analytical classifications for investigating
the presence of bundling, as well as sharply illustrating for each
classification the policy considerations whereby each can be deemed to
violate the Unbundling Rules, we next turn to applying them to the actual
proposals that have been made in recent years. We begin by noting that
there has been very little empirical work done on the prevalence of
bundling and the likelihood of Unbundling Rules violations.147 In this Part,
we provide a detailed analysis of bundling using each of the definitions that
we developed in Part III.
A. SAMPLE SELECTION
To create a sample for analysis, we use the ISS Voting Analytics
(“VA”) database,148 which provides data about the items on the ballot at the
annual meetings of Russell 3000 firms starting in 2003. In particular, for
each item it provides a classification and description, management
recommendation, ISS recommendations, and voting results. For the 2003–
2012 period, VA includes 226,850 observations: 219,853 relate to
management proposals—the subject of our study—and 6,997 relate to
shareholder proposals.
Among the 219,583 management proposals in the VA database,
163,952 relate to director elections (each nominee is a separate item) and
23,972 are proposals to ratify the auditors. We do not examine these
proposals because it seems unlikely that other items would be bundled with
them (as confirmed by our reading of some proposals in these
147. In addition to Bebchuk & Kamar, supra note 34, which focuses on proposals related to
mergers and acquisitions, there is an online student law review note that examines proxy statements in
an attempt to determine the extent of bundling. Julian Ellis, Note, The “Common Practice” of
Bundling: Fact or Fiction, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. ONLINE 105 (2014), http://www.denverlawreview.org/
storage/online-article-pdfs/2014/proxy-issue/Ellis_Antibundling_Final-Format.pdf. In that online note,
the author concludes that bundling does not actually occur all that often in practice. Using a sample of
company proposals, the author found only one company other than Apple whose proxy statement
“grouped together proposals that appeared significant.” Id. at 116. It is not clear from the note how the
author determines what exactly “significant” entails.
148. Voting Analytics, ISS, https://www.issgovernance.com/solutions/iss-analytics/votinganalytics/. All data obtained from the ISS Voting Analytics database are on file with authors.
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categories).149
That leaves us with three main categories for analysis: charter
amendments, M&A transactions involving mergers/consolidations, and
executive compensation plans or related changes to the number of
authorized shares of stock. Given that Bebchuk and Kamar have already
analyzed the use of the Unbundling Rules in the M&A context, 150 we
exclude another 1,082 proposals to approve a merger agreement or other
transactions (for example, asset sales or share issuances made in connection
with acquisitions). Also, we do not examine 22,507 compensation-related
proposals (for example, mandatory say-on-pay votes, approval of different
types of incentive plans) because the 2014 Interpretation exempts these
types of proposals from the reach of the Unbundling Rules.151
The remaining sample includes 5,326 management proposals, of
which 2,183 proposals are equity-related issues (such as proposals to
increase authorized common stock) and 3,143 are management proposals
related to governance provisions. Because it would be prohibitively costly
to read and code all of these proposals, we focus on a subset of governancerelated proposals that are described by ISS as involving an assortment of
bylaw and/or charter amendments. ISS places proposals that it is unable to
categorize as involving a single topic in these groupings. In particular, we
focus on all the management proposals classified by ISS in the following
categories:
M0126 - Amend Articles/Bylaws/Charter–Non-Routine (N=599);
M0267 - Company Specific–Board-Related (N=163);
M0106 - Amend Articles/Bylaws/Charter–Routine (N=87);
M0661 - Company-Specific–Organization-Related (N=68);
M0413 - Amend Articles/Bylaws/Charter–Organization-Related (N=34);
M0227 - Amend Articles–Board-Related (N=20);
M0602 - Amend Articles/Bylaws/Charter to Remove Antitakeover
Provision(s) (N=14);
M0122 - Adopt New Articles of Association/Charter (N=12);
149. For the same reasons, we do not examine 1,344 proposals requesting to adjourn the
shareholders’ meeting in case the proxies required to vote for other items on the ballot at the meeting
are not obtained (these proposals are usually the last item on the ballot at special meetings), and 844
items that ISS categorizes as “other business” (this is a generic category for proposals that may arise at
meetings, such as shareholder proposals from the floor).
150. Bebchuk & Kamar, supra note 34.
151. As we said earlier, we disagree with the SEC’s decision to exclude these proposals from the
reach of the Unbundling Rules. We suspect that bundling is quite common in these proposals as they
frequently seek shareholder approval for additional shares of authorized stock plus changes to equity
incentive plans for executives.
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M0378 - Amend Articles/Charter–Equity-Related (N=9);
M0660 - Amend Articles/Charter–Governance-Related (N=5);
M0377 - Amend Articles/Charter to Reflect Changes in Capital (N=3);
M0601 - Amend Articles/Bylaws/Charter to Include Antitakeover
Provision(s) (N=2).

Coincidentally, there are exactly 1,000 proposals that fall within these
categories. These proposals are particularly interesting to us because they
capture situations where the opportunity to bundle arises naturally (for
example, amending several different articles of the bylaws) and because
ISS was unable to categorize them more specifically, which is perhaps (but
not necessarily) an indication of their greater complexity and multiple
items.
VA also gathers many types of governance-related management
proposals within specific headings. For example, proposals are collected
under headings for declassifying the board, reducing super majority voting
requirements, changing the name of the corporation, and changing the state
of incorporation. During our ten-year sample period, there were a total of
2,143 such specifically referenced governance-related proposals that
appeared in fifty-six categories. In spite of the more precise categorization
by ISS, it is still possible that these proposals bundle different items. To
account for this possibility, whilst minimizing data collection costs, we
examine the largest set of proposals in the fifty-six categories, namely the
520 proposals to declassify the board (ISS category M0215). These
proposals are particularly important because of the importance of this antitakeover defense to many shareholders and its documented association with
firm value.152 Also, these proposals are usually submitted by management
in response to a non-binding shareholder proposal to declassify the board
that won a majority vote the previous year(s) and, thus, they generally
attract extremely high levels of shareholder support. As a result, they are of
particular interest for our study because management may try to bundle
these pro-shareholder proposals with other items viewed unfavorably by
shareholders in order to get the less favorable items passed.
152. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, 78 J. FIN.
ECON. 409 (2005); Alma Cohen & Charles Wang, How Do Staggered Boards Affect Shareholder
Value? Evidence from a Natural Experiment (Harvard Bus. Sch. Accounting & Mgmt. Unit, Working
Paper No. 13-068, 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2141410.
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B. HOW MUCH BUNDLING OCCURS?
After eliminating the various categories discussed above, our sample
comprises 1,520 proposals (1,000 proposals relating to charter/bylaw
amendments and 520 to declassify the board). For various reasons, such as
missing SEC filings for some companies, we cannot obtain all of the
necessary information to ascertain whether bundling takes place for 171 of
these proposals. This leaves us with a final sample of 1,349 proposals. The
first column of Table 1 below shows the annual distribution of these
proposals from 2003 to 2012. The number of proposals peaks in 2008 at
205, although there are more than one hundred proposals in eight of the ten
years in the sample. The remaining columns of Table 1 provide an
overview of the frequency of bundling of items in these proposals using the
alternative definitions of bundling introduced earlier in Part III. We discuss
each of these categories in the sections below.
TABLE 1. Frequency and Type of Bundling
No. of
Management
Proposals
Examined

No. (%) of
“Generic”
Bundled
Proposals
(% of Total
Sample)

No. (%) of
“Material”
Bundled
Proposals
(% of Bundled
Proposals)

No. (%) of “Multiple
Material” Bundled
Proposals
(% of Material
Bundled Proposals)

2003

72

14 (19.4%)

12 (85.7%)

8 (66.7%)

2004

104

34 (32.7%)

27 (79.4%)

19 (70.4%)

2005

143

50 (35.0%)

41 (82.0%)

35 (85.4%)

2006

133

37 (27.8%)

31 (83.8%)

25 (80.6%)

2007

182

44 (24.2%)

41 (93.2%)

38 (92.7%)

2008

205

53 (25.9%)

37 (69.8%)

25 (67.6%)

2009

159

37 (23.3%)

32 (86.5%)

23 (71.9%)

2010

135

37 (27.4%)

30 (81.1%)

25 (83.3%)

2011

118

41 (34.7%)

32 (78.0%)

26 (81.3%)

2012

98

41 (41.8%)

34 (83.0%)

28 (82.4%)

1,349

388 (28.8%)

317 (81.70%)

252 (79.5%)

Total
Sample
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1. Generic Bundling
For each of the 1,349 proposals in our final sample, we carefully read
the proposal description to identify all cases of generic bundling. As
discussed above, generic bundling is the broadest definition of bundling
and captures any proposal where the company has asked shareholders to
approve more than one item with a single vote, regardless of whether the
bundled items are technical, ministerial, or material. Thus, the frequency of
generic bundling may be viewed as representing an upper bound of
potential bundling violations in our sample.
As shown in the second column of Table 1, generic bundling is
widespread during this ten-year time period, occurring in 388 cases and
representing 28.8 percent of the total sample. In most sample years, the
frequency of generic bundling cases ranges between 20 and 30 percent,
with a minimum of 19.4 percent in 2003 and a maximum of 41.8 percent in
2012. This evidence suggests that at least this form of bundling is not
limited to a handful of cases, as suggested in prior commentary.
2. Material Bundling
Generic bundling, however, does not necessarily violate the
Unbundling Rules. As noted earlier in the discussion of Greenlight Capital
as well as the 2014 Interpretation, the bundling of only “‘ministerial or
technical matters’ that do not alter substantive shareholder rights” is not
proscribed.153 In order to differentiate between cases where the proposals
solely involve immaterial ministerial or technical items (“housekeeping”
matters) from situations where at least one item in the proposal has a
material effect on shareholder rights, we next identify the subset of the 388
generic bundling proposals that fit within the definition of material
bundling: that is, proposals in which at least one of the bundled items is of
material importance to shareholders.
The results of this process are shown in the third column of Table 1.
We classify 317 proposals as involving material bundling (the remaining
71 generic bundled proposals include only non-material items that are
bundled). Material bundled proposals represent 81.7 percent of the generic
bundled proposals, constituting almost one quarter (23.5 percent) of the
overall sample. Stated differently, and with the caveat that our sample may
have a relatively high frequency of bundling due to our selection process,
nearly one in four management resolutions submitted to shareholders
153. Greenlight Capital, L.P. v. Apple, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24716, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
22, 2013) (quoting THOMAS & DIXON, supra note 62, at 9-23, 9-24).
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within our ten-year sample entail material bundling. This is evidence of
pervasive violations of the Unbundling Rules given that under the standard
set forth in Greenlight Capital, any time a material item is bundled with
additional items (material or not), this “violates the letter of the law.”154
Our evidence of the frequency of material bundling suggests violations of
the Unbundling Rules are quite widespread, at least under this standard. We
believe this reflects a significant level of noncompliance with the rules
regulating proxies.
3. Multiple Material Bundling
Our third standard for Unbundling Rule violations is the one we
denoted as multiple material bundling—that is, any case where two or more
material items are bundled together in a single proposal for a vote. As
noted earlier, there seems to be no dispute that multiple material bundling
will violate the Unbundling Rules.155
Column 4 of Table 1 identifies the subset of material bundled
proposals with more than one material item in the bundle. In our sample,
252 proposals fit this definition, representing 79.5 percent of the material
bundled proposals, 64.9 percent of the generic bundled proposals, and
almost one-fifth (18.7 percent) of the overall sample. This indicates that
even under this more restrictive definition of bundling, a large number of
proposals violate the Unbundling Rules.
C. WHAT TYPES OF PROPOSALS DO COMPANIES BUNDLE TOGETHER?
Having documented the widespread occurrence of bundling in our
sample, we next look at what matters companies bundle on their ballots. As
a first step, Table 2 below shows the frequency of each type of bundling
across the main ISS proposal subcategories.156

154. Id. at *21–22 (“Permitting Apple to bundle numerous ‘technical’ matters with a single
material matter would appear to still violate the letter of the law . . . .”).
155. As noted earlier, the one exception would be the carve-out in the 2014 Interpretation for
executive compensation plans. See 2014 Interpretation, supra note 81.
156. Table 2 categorizes proposals in accordance with the following ISS classifications: Amend
Articles/Bylaws/Charter (M0126); Declassify the Board of Directors (M0215); Company
Specific/Board-Related (M0267); Amend Articles/Bylaws/Charter-Routine (M0106); CompanySpecific/Organization-Related (M0661); All Other Categories (M0122, M0227, M0377, M0378,
M0413, M0601, M0602, M0660).
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TABLE 2. Distribution of Frequency & Type of Bundling (ISS Categories)

No. of
Management
Proposals
Examined

No. (%) of
“Generic”
Bundled
Proposals
(% of
Total
Sample)

No. (%) of
“Material”
Bundled
Proposals
(% of
Bundled
Proposals)

No. (%) of
“Multiple
Material”
Bundled
Proposals
(% of
Material
Bundled
Proposals)

Amend
Articles/
Bylaws/Charter
-Non-Routine

515

126
(24.5%)

74
(58.7%)

55
(74.3%)

Declassify the
Board of
Directors

495

186
(37.6%)

186
(100.0%)

152
(81.7%)

Company
Specific/
Board-Related

134

21
(15.7%)

21
(100.0%)

16
(76.2%)

Amend
Articles/
Bylaws/
Charter
-Routine

74

27
(36.5%)

20
(74.1%)

14
(70.0%)

62

12
(19.4%)

8
(66.7%)

8
(100.0%)

69

16
(23.2%)

8
(50.0%)

7
(87.5%)

1349

388
(28.8%)

317
(81.7%)

252
(79.5%)

Proposal
Category

CompanySpecific/
OrganizationRelated
All Other
Categories
Total Sample

Table 2 shows that the incidence of the various types of bundling is
substantial across all the ISS categories that we examined. However,
because the ISS classifications are, with the exception of the board
declassification category, very general, the ISS breakdowns used in Table 2
shed little light on the actual content of most of the bundled proposals.

1228

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89:1179

Thus, to gain a better understanding of the content of bundled
proposals, we focus on the subset of material bundled proposals. We assign
each of the material items bundled in them to a category that reflects its
focus. In total, our sample of 317 material bundled proposals includes 613
material items, 157 corresponding on average to 1.93 material items per
proposal (the number of material items per proposal ranges from one to
five). To provide the reader with a sense of the potential implications of
bundling, we also classify each material item as “Negative” or “Positive,”
depending on whether it decreases (Negative) or expands (Positive)
shareholder rights. In doing so, consistent with the approach used to
classify proposals as material, we rely on the current view of best practices
in corporate governance (as reflected in the governance ratings, proxy
advisors’ voting guidelines, and voting policies of major institutional
investors). Nonetheless, as discussed earlier, we acknowledge that the
classification in some cases is subjective.
The results are reported in Table 3. For each item included in a
material bundled proposal, Panel A presents the items that decrease
shareholder power (Negative Items), and Panel B presents the items that
increase shareholder power (Positive Items). The items in both panels are
categorized as Board-related, Voting-related, Meeting-related, Takeoverrelated or Other. Board-related items refer to procedural rules regarding
director selection and general director requirements. Voting-related items
include changes that are related to board or shareholder voting. Meetingrelated items refer to procedural rules relating to shareholder meetings,
such as changes to advance notice procedures or rules governing quorum
requirements. Takeover-related are those items that are directly related to
raising or lowering the likelihood of a takeover.158
157. We classify the content of each bundled item rather than trying to classify types of bundled
proposals per se because our sample contains very few bundled proposals that are completely identical.
158. If an item could be included in more than one category, we classify it in the category that
seems most closely related to the item. For example, we classify a proposal to declassify the board as
Takeover-related rather than Board-related.
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TABLE 3. Panel A. Negative Items in “Material” Bundled Proposals
Board-related
Expand indemnification D&O/limit personal liability

18

Enhance board authority in filling vacancies

9

Increase board power (vis-à-vis shareholders) in director removal process

7

Allow board to alter the number of directors without shareholder approval

5

Allow director removal only for cause

3

Other Board-related

11

Subtotal

50
Voting-related

Eliminate/Restrict cumulative voting

11

Introduce supermajority voting requirements

3

Increase vote required to call a special meeting

1

Other Voting-related

11

Subtotal

26
Meeting-related

Restrict advance notice procedures

8

Increase board authority regarding selection of meeting date/location

4

Increase quorum requirements

3

Other Meeting-related

3

Subtotal

18
Takeover-related

Blank check preferred stock provision

6

Classify board

2

Other Takeover-related

3

Subtotal

11
Other

Lack of clear information on the bundled item

10

Allow board to amend bylaws without a shareholder vote

7

Provide that shareholders may not act by written consent in lieu of a meeting

2

Add forum selection clause

1

Remaining items in the Other category

23

Subtotal

43

Total Negative Items

148
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TABLE 3. Panel B. Positive Items in “Material” Bundled Proposals
Board-related
Adopt majority voting for director elections

19

Increase shareholders’ power (vis-à-vis the board) in director removal process

6

Enhance shareholder power in filling vacancies

2

Other Board-related

11

Subtotal

38
Voting-related

Eliminate/Reduce Supermajority Voting Requirements

87

Decrease voting threshold for amendments approved by 2/3 of directors

2

Reduce voting threshold for special meetings

1

Other Voting-related

9

Subtotal

99
Meeting-related

Make it easier to call a special meeting

3

Decrease quorum requirements

1

Increase notice period for meetings

1

Other Meeting-related

6

Subtotal

11
Takeover-related

Declassify board

210

Allow directors to be removed without cause

92

Terminate poison pill

1

Other Takeover-related

2

Subtotal

305
Other

Enhance shareholders’ power to act by written consent

2

Increase shareholders’ power to amend bylaws

1

Eliminate dual class stock structure

1

Remaining items in the Other category

8

Subtotal

12

Total Positive Items

465
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Panel A of Table 3 shows that we identify 148 negative material
items. Most of the negative items fall in the Board-related category (50
items), followed by Voting-related (26), Meeting-related (18), and
Takeover-related (11). The most frequent negative bundled item is a
provision to expand indemnification and/or limit personal liability for
directors and officers (18 items). Other relatively frequent items are
provisions eliminating or restricting cumulative voting (11 items),
provisions enhancing board authority in filling board vacancies (9 items),
provisions restricting advance notice procedures (8 items), provisions
allowing the board to amend the bylaws without a shareholder vote
(7 items), provisions increasing board power (vis-à-vis shareholders) in the
director removal process (7 items), and blank check preferred stock
provisions (6 items).
The Other category includes 10 cases we classify as negative because
the proxy statement failed to disclose clearly what the shareholders were
being asked to approve via the bundled proposal. An interesting example is
NL Industries, Inc. where multiple technical items (for example,
“(iii) remove certain provisions of the company’s current certificate of
incorporation that are similar to provisions of the New Jersey Business
Corporation Act . . . (iv) make technical amendments to update the name
and address of the company’s registered agent and office”)159 were bundled
with other items with potentially material but unclear implications for
shareholders. These vague disclosures led ISS to note:
ISS has concerns that the company’s disclosure of the proposed
amendments in its proxy statement does not specify such amendments’
implications on shareholders’ rights in regards to the amendment of
Article VII, concerning shareholders’ right to call special
meetings . . . . Although the proposed amendments would update the
company’s charter to date, ISS recommends that shareholders vote
AGAINST this proposal for lack of disclosure and potentially
diminishing of shareholders’ rights.160

The NL Industries example illustrates how bundling multiple items
into a single proposal can obfuscate the implications of the bundled
159. INST’L S’HOLDER SERVS. (USA), PROXY REPORT REGARDING NL INDUS., INC. 14 (May 3,
2008). Although the SEC issued a comment letter noting a concern with this proxy statement, the
comment was unrelated to the bundled proposal. See Letter from Terence O’Brien, Sec. Exch. Comm’n,
to Harold C. Simmons, Chief Exec. Officer, NL Industries, Inc. (June 30, 2008), https://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/72162/000000000008032219/filename1.pdf.
160. INST’L S’HOLDER SERVS. (USA), PROXY REPORT REGARDING NL INDUS., INC. 14 (May 3,
2008).
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proposal on shareholder rights. 161 It also illustrates why a legal standard
that allows the bundling of a single material item with multiple technical
and ministerial items (as the SEC permits in the 2014 Interpretation) would
in practice be difficult to enforce, easy to abuse, and ultimately ineffective.
Next, Panel B shows that there are 465 positive material items,
including 38 Board-related items, 99 Voting-related items, 11 Meetingrelated items, and 305 Takeover-related items, with the remaining 12 items
classified as “Other.” Overall, the number of positive items is more than
three times the number of negative items. However, this is largely because
there were 210 proposals where board declassification was bundled with
other items, such as an item allowing directors to be removed without cause
(this particular bundle occurs in 92 cases).
If we temporarily disregard the 302 items that relate to the Declassify
the Board of Directors (M0215) category from Table 2 (namely, board
declassification (210) and director removal without cause (92)), we see that
there are only 163 other positive material items that relate to charter and
bylaw amendments categories (that is, all the categories in Table 2 other
than M0215). This number is just slightly more than the 148 negative
material items in those categories. Thus, in the portion of our sample that
relates to charter and bylaw amendments (that is, excluding board
declassification proposals and for-cause requirements to remove directors),
companies appear to be bundling roughly the same number of positive and
negative items. Comparing the composition of these remaining positive and
negative items, the largest difference is in the Voting-related items, which
contain a large number of positive items related to eliminating or reducing
supermajority voting (87 proposals). We also note that of the 148 negative
items, 37.2 percent (55 out of 155) were bundled in the same resolution
with a positive proposal. That is, the classic form of distorted choice was
present in this group more than one-third of the time.
There is no intrinsic need for these items to be bundled with other
items. Indeed, in our work mining the VA database to collect our sample,
we found abundant proxy statements where firms present virtually all the
161. Another example of this category is Proposal 3 from the 2010 Annual Meeting of Medifast,
Inc. Medifast, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (DEF 14A), at 31 (Aug. 24, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/910329/000114420410046388/v194987_def14a.htm. This proposal requested that
stockholders ratify changes to the company’s bylaws, but the proposal did not describe the changes that
shareholders were being asked to ratify. Nor did the proposal include the updated text of the bylaws.
Instead, the proposal merely listed the reasons the board thought the change was necessary, such as the
need to address “[f]alse reports about the Company by a group of convicted felons which negatively
affected shareholder value by contributing to stock price volatility.” Id.
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items listed in Table 3 as separate, single-item proposals. In other words,
companies are fully capable of presenting these proposals as separate items
on their proxy statement.
V. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: SHAREHOLDER VOTING ON
BUNDLED PROPOSALS
The final step in our analysis is to gather evidence on how proxy
advisors respond to bundling, their recommendations in connection with
bundled proposals, and how shareholders vote on bundled proposals.
Previous studies document a strong correlation between shareholder votes
and recommendations issued from ISS, the most influential proxy advisory
firm, and, to a lesser extent, Glass Lewis, its closest competitor.162 Across a
variety of settings, such as shareholder proposals, say-on-pay votes, and
director elections, an ISS or Glass Lewis recommendation is generally
associated with 20–30 percent or 5–10 percent more votes, respectively,
cast in line with the recommendation. Previous studies further document
that the extent of proxy advisors’ influence varies depending on the topics,
the rationale underlying the recommendation, and the composition of the
shareholder base (for example, proxy advisors’ influence is more
pronounced among smaller mutual funds with fewer resources and lower
incentives to perform their own proxy analysis).163
In Table 4 we present data on the voting outcome of bundled
proposals, the frequency of proxy advisors’ positive and negative
recommendations, and the association between such recommendations and
voting outcomes. We report these data for the samples of generic bundled
proposals, material bundled proposals, multiple material bundled proposals,
and negative bundled proposals. This last category contains all material
bundled proposals where at least one material item is “negative” based on
the classification shown in Table 3. We identify 84 negative bundled
proposals, representing 26.5 percent of the 317 material bundled proposals.
It is illuminating to evaluate proxy advisors’ policies with regard to
162. For a description of the proxy advisory industry, see generally Stephen Choi, Jill Fisch &
Marcel Kahan, The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or Reality?, 59 EMORY L.J. 869 (2010). For a
review of the literature on shareholder voting, see Fabrizio Ferri, “Low-Cost” Shareholder Activism: A
Review of the Evidence, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 192
(Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell eds., 2012).
163. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi, Jill. E. Fisch & Marcel Kahan, Director Elections and the Role of
Proxy Advisors, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 649 (2009); Yonca Ertimur, Fabrizio Ferri & David Oesch,
Shareholder Votes and Proxy Advisors: Evidence from Say on Pay, 51 J. ACCT. RES. 951 (2013); Peter
Iliev & Michelle Lowry, Are Mutual Funds Active Voters?, 28 REV. FIN. STUD. 446 (2015).
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bundling against the background of our negative bundling sample. As noted
in Part II.C, ISS’s policy is to recommend “for” the bundled proposal if the
net effect of the different items is beneficial to shareholders and “against”
if the net effect is perceived as detrimental to shareholder rights. Glass
Lewis does not seem to have a general policy about bundling, but does in
practice seem to follow something akin to the ISS policy. In other words,
both ISS and Glass Lewis essentially make their voting recommendations
on bundled proposals based on the perceived net effect of the items in the
bundle. This implies that they will consider making a negative
recommendation only if there is at least one item in the bundle that has a
material adverse effect on shareholder rights. Hence, the subset of negative
bundled proposals may be viewed as an upper bound of the number of
cases where ISS and Glass Lewis may conclude that the net effect of the
bundled proposal is negative and thus issue a negative recommendation.164
TABLE 4. Panel A. Voting Outcomes & Proxy Advisor Recommendations
Frequency of ISS Recommendations
“Generic”
Bundled
Proposals

“Material”
Bundled
Proposals

“Multiple
Material”
Bundled
Proposals

“Negative”
Bundled
Proposals

388

317

252

84

... ISS
recommends
AGAINST

31
(8.0%)

31
(9.8%)

27
(10.7%)

31
(36.9%)

... ISS
recommends
FOR

357
(92.0%)

286
(90.2%)

225
(89.3%)

53
(63.1%)

Number of
Proposals
All

164. As noted in Part II.C, in practice sometimes ISS appears to follow a different policy, issuing
a negative recommendation if any of the bundled items would get a negative recommendation on a
stand-alone basis. Even under this policy, our sample of negative bundled proposals represents a useful
benchmark to examine in how many cases ISS concludes that the negative material item is significant
enough to trigger a negative recommendation for the bundled proposal.

QUIETING THE SHAREHOLDERS’ VOICE

2016]

1235

TABLE 4. Panel B. Voting Outcomes & Proxy Advisor Recommendations
Voting Outcome (Overall and by ISS Recommendation)
% Votes
Against
“Generic”
Bundled
Proposals

% Votes
Against
“Material”
Bundled
Proposals

% Votes
Against
“Multiple
Material”
Bundled
Proposals

% Votes
Against
“Negative”
Bundled
Proposals

All

4.2%

4.7%

4.9%

13.6%

... ISS
recommends
AGAINST

25.7%

25.7%

25.8%

25.7%

... ISS
recommends
FOR

2.3%

2.5%

2.4%

6.1%

Category

TABLE 4. Panel C. Voting Outcomes & Proxy Advisor Recommendations
Frequency of Glass Lewis Recommendations
“Generic”
Bundled
Proposals

“Material”
Bundled
Proposals

“Multiple
Material”
Bundled
Proposals

“Negative”
Bundled
Proposals

329

271

236

74

…GL
recommends
AGAINST

34
(10.3%)

31
(11.4%)

23
(9.7%)

27
(36.5%)

... GL
recommends FOR

295
(89.7%)

240
(88.6%)

213
(90.3%)

47
(63.5%)

Number of
Proposals
Subset of
proposals for
which GL
recommendations
are available
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TABLE 4. Panel D. Voting Outcomes & Proxy Advisor Recommendations
Voting Outcome (Overall and by Glass Lewis Recommendation)
% Votes
Against
“Generic”
Bundled
Proposals

% Votes
Against
“Material”
Bundled
Proposals

% Votes
Against
“Multiple
Material”
Bundled
Proposals

% Votes
Against
“Negative”
Bundled
Proposals

388

317

252

84

…GL
recommends
AGAINST

31
(8.0%)

31
(9.8%)

27
(10.7%)

31
(36.9%)

... GL
recommends FOR

357
(92.0%)

286
(90.2%)

225
(89.3%)

53
(63.1%)

Number of
Proposals

Subset of
proposals for
which GL
recommendations
are available

TABLE 4. Panel E. Voting Outcomes & Proxy Advisor Recommendations
Overlap Between ISS and Glass Lewis Recommendations on “Generic”
Bundled Proposals

ISS recommends
FOR

ISS recommends
AGAINST

Glass Lewis
Recommends
FOR

Glass Lewis
Recommends
AGAINST

No.

283

17

% Votes
Against

2.0%

9.4%

No.

12

17

% Votes
Against

26.1%

25.7%
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TABLE 4. Panel F. Voting Outcomes & Proxy Advisor Recommendations
Overlap Between ISS and Glass Lewis Recommendations on “Negative”
Bundled Proposals

ISS
recommends
FOR
ISS
recommends
AGAINST

Glass Lewis
Recommends
FOR

Glass Lewis
Recommends
AGAINST

Num.

35

10

% Votes Against

3.9%

14.4%

Num.

12

17

% Votes Against

26.1%

25.7%

As shown in Panel A, ISS recommends a vote against 31 out of the
388 generic bundled proposals in our sample. Notably, all cases of
“against” recommendations from ISS involve proposals that we code as
negative bundling, which provides support for our coding classification.
These 31 cases of ISS “against” recommendations, while constituting only
8.0 percent and 9.8 percent of the generic and material bundling sample,
respectively, represent 36.9 percent of the negative bundling cases. This
figure is of particular interest because, as discussed earlier, the negative
bundling sample represents the upper bound of the number of “against”
recommendations potentially issued by proxy advisors. The reason why
ISS issues an “against” recommendation for only 31 of the 84 (36.9
percent) negative bundled proposals, with the remaining 53 proposals
receiving a “for” recommendation, is that many of these negative bundled
proposals also contain positive items (such as a proposal to declassify the
board or to adopt majority voting) and ISS assesses the net effect to be
positive for shareholders.
We also examine how frequently ISS’s analysis of the proposal
explicitly mentions its bundled nature. 165 In untabulated results, we find
that ISS highlights the bundled nature of the proposal in only 12.9 percent
of the generic bundling sample. We conjecture that this low frequency
occurs because ISS only mentions bundling when it involves material (or
material negative) items. However, even in the subsample of material and
material negative bundling, the frequency of cases where the ISS report
explicitly alerts shareholders about the bundled nature of the proposal
165. We do not have access to the Glass Lewis reports. Hence, we performed this analysis only
for the ISS reports.
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remains low at 15.4 percent and 28.2 percent, respectively. It is consistent
with the fact that bundling per se does not trigger a negative ISS
recommendation, but it also means that shareholders cannot rely on ISS’s
analysis to identify bundled proposals. We deduce from this that ISS does
not accord bundling much weight when evaluating bundled proposals.
Panel B reports data on the voting outcome. On average, the
percentage of votes against generic bundled proposals [hereinafter voting
dissent] is fairly low, at 4.2 percent. However, when ISS recommends
against the proposal, negative votes increase to 25.7 percent, confirming
the strong association between voting outcomes and ISS recommendations
documented in prior studies on shareholder voting. This association,
combined with the fact that all the “against” recommendations from ISS
involve cases of negative bundling, explains the higher average voting
dissent for the negative bundling subsample (13.6 percent versus 4.2
percent for all bundling cases). While not reported in Panel B, we note that
7 of the 31 proposals with negative ISS recommendations failed to pass
because they did not achieve the required majority, or supermajority, vote.
This constitutes further evidence of the potential impact of ISS
recommendations on voting outcomes. The lack of shareholder approval
may also suggest that managers deployed bundling to avoid exactly what
did occur: failure of the shareholders to approve the negative impact
proposal. Indeed, the presence of bundling in connection with any negative
material proposals raises concern of whether bundling moved the needle
toward shareholder approval at least from what it would have been had the
material negative item not been bundled. This concern is all the greater in
light of the decision by the largest proxy advisory firm, ISS, to issue
recommendations based on the net impact of the proposal, thus allowing
companies that bundle negative items to potentially receive favorable
voting recommendations.
In Panels C and D of Table 4, we present similar data for the subset of
329 generic bundled proposals for which we were able to obtain Glass
Lewis recommendations. While we only have access to Glass Lewis
recommendations for the 2004–2011 period, the pattern is generally similar
to the one reported in Panels A and B for ISS. The frequency of “against”
recommendations from Glass Lewis in the generic bundling sample is 10.3
percent, increasing to 11.4 percent in cases of material bundling and 36.5
percent in cases of negative bundling (Panel C). On average, voting dissent
for generic bundled proposals is low, at 4.5 percent, but it increases to 18.1
percent when Glass Lewis recommends against the proposal. This increase
is more pronounced for the negative bundling cases, where an “against”
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recommendation from Glass Lewis is associated with an average voting
dissent of 22.1 percent (Panel D).
Moving on to Panel E, for the subset of 329 bundled proposals with
both ISS and Glass Lewis recommendations available, we also report the
frequency of cases where one or both of the proxy advisors issue an
“against” recommendation, and the associated voting outcome. It appears
that there is significant “disagreement” between the two advisors: out of the
46 cases (= 17+17+12) where at least one of them recommends against the
proposal, they “agree” (both recommend ‘against’) only in 17 cases (37.0
percent).166
The contrasting positions of ISS and Glass Lewis shine a light on how
even expert proxy advisors can reach different conclusions when evaluating
the net effect of bundled proposals, perhaps because of the confusing
disclosures and complex nature of many of these bundled proposals. This
lack of concordance supports our earlier position that the benefits or
detriments of a particular proposal are difficult to determine ex ante.
Hence, our position is that it is far better to favor separate treatment so that
the proof of the pudding can be its tasting. If each material proposal was
the subject of a separate shareholder vote, we would expect much greater
consistency in these recommendations. As explained earlier, the Adopting
Release and Koppel each make the case for a strong presumption of
separate treatment. This is also indirect evidence of the weakness of the
current SEC regulations related to the Unbundling Rules because even
experts applying similar standards appear to disagree on the full
implications of many of these proposals.
Panel E also shows that the association between recommendations and
voting outcomes is much more pronounced for ISS recommendations than
for Glass Lewis recommendations. For example, when Glass Lewis
recommends in favor of the proposal, an “against” ISS recommendation is
associated with a 24.1 percent increase in voting dissent (from 2 to 26.1
percent). In contrast, when ISS recommends in favor of the proposal, an
“against” Glass Lewis recommendation is only associated with a 7.4
166. In Panel F, we repeat the analysis in Panel E for the subset of 74 bundled proposals classified
as cases of negative bundling and with available data on both ISS and Glass Lewis recommendations.
The results are generally similar. Out of the 39 cases (= 17+10+12) where at least one of the proxy
advisors recommends against the proposal, they “agree” (both recommend “against”) in 17 cases (43.6
percent). The association between recommendations and voting outcomes continues to be more
pronounced for ISS recommendations, and there is very limited shareholder scrutiny of proposals that
do not receive an “against” voting recommendation from at least one proxy advisor (voting dissent in
these cases is only 3.9 percent).
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percent increase in voting dissent (from 2 to 9.4 percent). This evidence is
consistent with prior studies167 and can be explained by the fact that ISS
has a much larger client base.168
The other important insight from Panel E is that voting dissent when
neither of these proxy advisors recommend against a bundled proposal is
only 2.0 percent. This suggests that institutional investors give little
scrutiny to bundled proposals unless they are singled out by proxy advisors
for negative recommendations. Hence, it becomes even more important that
proxy advisors revise their policy guidelines regarding bundling.
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
When the SEC adopted the Unbundling Rules in 1992, it acted to
fulfill the shareholder franchise by enabling shareholders to better convey
their views to boards of directors; by so acting, the SEC also protected
against corporate management distorting shareholders’ choices in a way
that led investors to mistakenly approve items that they did not truly want
to enact. The need to protect the shareholder franchise from these evils is
just as strong today as it was then.
During the past twenty plus years, the courts have tried to insure that
the Unbundling Rules are interpreted in a manner that is consistent with
this intention in their decisions. In the Koppel and Greenlight Capital
decisions, the courts developed sensible rules based on thoughtful
interpretations of the Unbundling Rules. However, the SEC did not pay
sufficient attention to these judicial decisions and instead has undermined
the integrity of these rules with its interpretive releases. These releases
have both exempted large categories of shareholder proposals from the
reach of the Unbundling Rules without any explanation and created vague
criterion for evaluating the remaining proposals. The ambiguous standards
proposed by the SEC make it easy for companies to avoid shareholder
scrutiny and distort investor choices. Proxy advisors have contributed to the
failure to enforce the Unbundling Rules by employing analytical techniques
in evaluating management proposals that fail to deter violations. In the
remainder of this section, we briefly outline some ways in which the SEC,
third party voting advisors, and institutional investors can better implement
167. See, e.g., Ertimur, supra note 163.
168. Scott S. Winter, Director, Innisfree M&A Inc., Trends in Shareholder Voting – The Impact
of Proxy Advisory Firms, Presentation at Am. Bar Ass’n Corp. Governance Comm., at 1 (Oct. 12,
2010), http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/committees/CL260000pub/materials/20101012/TrendsShare
holderVoting.PDF (“ISS clients typically control 20–30 [percent] of a midcap/largecap corporation’s
outstanding shares. Glass Lewis clients typically control 5–10 [percent] of such shares.”).
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the Unbundling Rules.
First, we recommend that the SEC withdraw its 2004 Guidance, the
2015 Interpretation, and the 2014 Interpretation, and replace them with a
simpler, more transparent, standard. In particular, the SEC should act
consistently with the court decisions so that any material proposal must be
separately presented. Furthermore, it should discard the vague and easily
abused “inextricably intertwined” exemption for complex proposals, which
presents an invitation for abuse, and eliminate the exemption for executive
compensation proposals. In its place, the SEC should clearly and narrowly
define what kinds of matters are not separate. For example, the SEC should
carefully set forth rules of what constitutes a recapitalization in a manner
consistent with the analysis developed above.
Second, we propose that the SEC at least adopt the material bundling
definition that we developed in Part III.B to determine when a proposal
needs to be presented separately to the shareholders. This test is less strict
than the generic bundling test, but more stringent than the multiple material
bundling standard, both of which are discussed in that same section. The
material bundling test is consistent with the judicial guidance given in
Greenlight Capital and, as reasoned earlier, is consistent with the
materiality standard commonly employed in addressing the information
needs of shareholders voting on proxy matters. While it is likely to slightly
increase the number of items that are presented as separate proposals to
shareholders on the corporate ballot, its advantages far outweigh the
relatively small costs associated with that increase. The material bundling
test will do a far better job of presenting shareholders with undistorted
choices that allow them to freely express their preferences to corporate
boards.
Third, we propose that the standard for determining a proposal’s
materiality be expanded to include any matter whose initiation or
amendment, as a matter of state law, requires the concurrence of the
shareholders. This change is rooted in our discussion earlier that proxy
rules should complement rather than trivialize state corporate law, at least
when it comes to the rights of shareholders to communicate their views on
a single proposal.
Fourth, we urge the third party voting advisors to stop ignoring
violations of the Unbundling Rules in making their voting
recommendations. As advocates for their institutional investor clients, they
need to adopt strict policies of issuing “against” recommendations on any
management proposal that violates the Unbundling Rules. If they made
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such a change, and the SEC adopted the material bundling standard we
suggest, third party voting advisors would be much better able to provide
their clients with clear voting guidance. This would deter companies from
violating the Unbundling Rules and lead to better enforcement of them.
Finally, institutional investors need to demand these changes. The
SEC has shown in the past that it will respond to informed shareholder
pressure to enforce its rules. Collectively, the institutional investors should
make it clear that the Unbundling Rules are an important part of protecting
the shareholder franchise. They should also clarify their voting policies to
make it clear that they will vote against all improperly bundled proposals.
This would also have the advantage of making it clear to the third party
voting advisors what their clients consider important.

